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PROVISIONAL CREDITOR REMEDIES




Although virtually impervious for more than a century to the
gentle caress of evolutionary change,' heightened judicial sensitivity
to procedural fairness and newly aroused passions of consumerism
finally burst forth in 1969 to revolutionize the law of debtor-creditor
relations. In that year the United States Supreme Court held that
the prejudgment garnishment by Family Finance Corporation of
Mrs. Sniadach's wages, in the amount of $31.59, without affording
her any prior notice or an opportunity to be heard, was a deprivation
of property without due process of law in violation of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution.! Sniadach u. Family
Finance Corp. precipitated a judicial upheaval casting doubt on the
continued validity of all the so-called provisional creditor remedies, 3
as well as the many special creditor lien statutes,' and caused great
concern in the personal finance industry. Resolution of the ques-
tions Mrs. Sniadach raised has already spawned four more Supreme
Court decisions and a plethora of lower court opinions, many of
them conflicting.
5
Those decisions are analyzed in this article, and an attempt is
made to formulate a workable constitutional standard by which to
evaluate present creditor remedies. Florida's provisional remedy
* This article was prepared by the author for the former Florida Law Revision Council to
assist the council in its study of Florida's provisional creditor remedies. The opinions, conclu-
sions, and recommendations contained in this article are entirely those of the author and do
not necessarily represent or reflect the opinions, conclusions, or recommendations of the
Florida Law Revision Council.
** Associate Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law. A.B. 1958, Univer-
sity of Michigan; J.D. 1964, University of Iowa.
1. The present Florida garnishment statute traces its origins directly to Act of Dec. 17,
1845, ch. 43, §§ 1-14, 1845 Fla. Laws 112. The present attachment statute is drawn basically
from Act of Feb. 15, 1834, ch. 741, §§ 1-10, 1834 Fla. Laws 11; Act of Feb. 14, 1835, ch. 854,
§§ 1-7, 1835 Fla. Laws 313; and Act of Dec. 20, 1859, ch. 998, §§ 1-2, 1859 Fla. Laws 16.
2. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
3. The phrase "provisional creditor remedy" includes a variety of prejudgment statutory
remedies, the most common of which are garnishment, attachment, and replevin. The thrust
of these procedures is to permit the creditor to seize property belonging to the debtor pending
final adjudication of the underlying claim.
4. Statutes granting special lien status to landlords, innkeepers, garagemen, artisans,
suppliers, and laborers are common.
5. Carey v. Sugar, 425 U.S. 73 (1976); North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419
U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67 (1972). These cases are considered in section M. A. infra.
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statutes and Florida's procedures for enforcement of final judg-
ments are reviewed. Since most of these statutes have been found
unconstitutional, remedial legislation is proposed.
II. THE NATURE OF PROVISIONAL CREDITOR REMEDIES
A. Generally
Before turning to the specific requirements of the statutes, it may
be useful to discuss the impact of the provisional remedies on the
relationship between creditor and debtor.' The norm in our judi-
cial process is that a plaintiff is not entitled to any satisfaction on
his claim until it is fully adjudicated and final judgment has been
rendered by a court. Only then may he invoke the power of the
state, through levy of execution, to have the debtor's property
seized and sold to satisfy the judgment. The provisional remedies,
historically deemed extraordinary, enable the plaintiff to cause the
defendant's property to be seized, actually or constructively, and
withheld, pending final determination of the plaintiff's underlying
claim.
Thus, from the very beginning of his action, the plaintiff has some
assurance that there will be property available to satisfy a final
judgment. Moreover, such property is insulated against disposition
or dissipation by the defendant during the course of the litigation.
The plaintiff in effect becomes a secured creditor, protected from
voluntary actions which the defendant might take affecting his abil-
ity to satisfy the plaintiff's judgment. Further, the lien on the
debtor's property establishes the plaintiff's priority vis-a-vis the
defendant's other creditors with respect to that property. Conse-
quently, without any consent by the defendant or any prior judicial
determination of the merits of the plaintiff's claim, the plaintiff is
immune from the competing claims of both subsequent purchasers
and creditors, even though the latter might actually obtain judg-
ment first. In addition, in the event of a later bankruptcy of a
judgment debtor, the lien of a judgment creditor relates back to the
date of attachment or garnishment, thus often serving to defeat the
trustee's extraordinary power to avoid judicial liens obtained within
four months of bankruptcy.7
One other aspect of the provisional remedies should also be men-
6. References herein to garnishment refer to prejudgment garnishment unless otherwise
indicated. Garnishment is also used after judgment to reach indebtedness owed to the judg-
ment debtor by third persons, as well as tangible and intangible property owned by the
judgment debtor but held in the possession or control of third persons. FLA. STAT. §§ 77.01,
.03 (1977).
7. Bankruptcy Act §§ 60, 67a, 11 U.S.C. §§ 96, 107(a) (1976).
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tioned. Property seized by attachment or garnishment constitutes
the basis for quasi-in-rem jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.
Although, in some cases, in personam jurisdiction might be avail-
able under a longarm statute, the certainty afforded by quasi-in-
rem process is often of great significance to the plaintiff and an
inducement to the nonresident defendant to appear personally."
Indeed, the provisional writs had their historical origin in compel-
ling the defendant's appearance rather than as a prejudgment
collection device.' The strong interest of the state in providing a
jurisdictional basis by which its citizens may have their claims
against nonresidents litigated domestically still serves as perhaps
the most compelling justification for the provisional remedies.
B. Attachment
In order to appreciate the dictates of the Supreme Court concern-
ing the validity of provisional remedies, it is necessary to examine
in some detail their precise procedural requirements. The Florida
attachment and garnishment statutes are typical. Chapter 76 of the
Florida Statutes authorizes the plaintiff in an action on a debt 0 to
obtain a writ of attachment from the court commanding the sheriff
to attach so much of the defendant's property as is sufficient to
satisfy the debt." The plaintiff must post a bond" and allege by
8. The whole area of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction has been thrown into considerable doubt
by the recent case of Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), in which the Supreme Court
overruled the century-old case of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), which had premised
quasi-in-rem jurisdiction on the state's power over the property seized. In Shaffer, the Court
held that due process requires governing quasi-in-rem jurisdiction by the same standard of
fairness and substantial justice which governs in personam jurisdiction, as articulated in
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). This analysis will require courts
to consider the significance to be accorded the presence of the property within the forum state
and its relationship to the cause of action asserted in the underlying suit. See 433 U.S. at
208.
And recently, in Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978), the Supreme Court affirmed
its holding in Shaffer. In Kulko, the Court focused on the defendant's activity in California
to determine whether that state's asserted jurisdiction over him was warranted.
9. See Williams, Creditors' Prejudgment Remedies: Expanding Strictures on Traditional
Rights, 25 U. FIA. L. REv. 60, 62-63 (1972).
10. FLA. STAT. § 76.01 (1977). The debt must be liquidated and not contingent. See
Papadakos v. Spooner, 186 So. 2d 786, 789 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1966). It need not actually
be due, FLA. STAT. § 76.05 (1977), but if grounds for attachment exist, the debt is accelerated
and becomes due. Id. § 76.06. Attachment is not available to the plaintiff in a tort action
since the amount of damages cannot be readily and mechanically determined. See Robinson
v. Loyola Foundation, Inc., 236 So. 2d 154, 157 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1970); cf. Hamilton
Michelsen Groves Co. v. Penney, 58 F.2d 761 (5th Cir. 1932) (equitable attachment denied
in tort claim).
11. FLA. STAT. § 76.13(1) (1977). The sheriff may attach property of a value sufficient to
satisfy the debt and costs of the action.
12. Id. § 76.12. The attachment bond must be in an amount double the debt demanded
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motion the existence of one or more of the statutory grounds for
attachment. 3 Generally, these grounds include specified actual or
threatened acts on the part of the defendant which would put him
or his property beyond the reach of creditors or the jurisdiction of
the court." Once the motion is filed, the clerk issues the writ without
hearing or notice to the defendant. The writ is then delivered to the
sheriff for levy.
Personal property is levied on by actual seizure, while real prop-
erty is levied on by recording a notice of the levy in the official
records of the county where the property is located. The defendant
thus loses the present use and enjoyment of personal property.
Though the attachment does not dispossess the defendant from his
real property, it creates a lien giving the creditor priority over all
subsequent creditors and purchasers. 5 The defendant may sell the
property subject to the attachment lien, but, as a practical matter,
the lien constitutes a cloud on the title and ordinarily must be
satisfied before sale.
If the defendant wants to regain possession (or have the lien re-
moved) before final judicial determination of the plaintiffs claim,
he may either post a bond conditioned on the forthcoming of the
property or payment of the judgment if the plaintiff is successful."
and conditioned to pay all costs and damages which defendant may sustain if the attachment
is later found to be improper. The measure of damages for wrongful attachment of chattels
is the value of their use for the period the defendant was deprived of possession and any loss
or injury to the property, plus reasonable attorney's fees incurred in dissolving the attach-
ment. See Williams, supra note 9, at 69. The amount of the recovery is limited by the amount
of the bond. However, the defendant may also have a separate action against the plaintiff
for malicious prosecution. Strickland v. Commerce Loan Co., 158 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1963).
13. FLA. STAT. §§ 76.09-.10 (1977). When the debt is actually due, the creditor need only
allege he has reason to believe in the existence of adequate statutory grounds. If the debt is
not yet due, the creditor must prove, by affidavit (other than his own) or other satisfactory
proof, the actual existence of one or more of the statutory grounds.
14. Id. §§ 76.04, .10. When the debt is actually due, the statutory grounds for attachment
can be summarized to include (1) the nonresidency of the defendant, (2) that he is actually
removing or about to remove himself or his property from the state or the judicial circuit, (3)
that he is absconding or concealing himself or secreting his property, or (4) that he is actually
disposing or about to dispose of his property fraudulently. The grounds are more limited when
the debt is not yet due and include only the actual removal of the debtor's property from the
state or the fraudulent secreting or disposal thereof.
15. Id. § 76.14.
16. Section 76.18 of the Florida Statutes (1977) provides for the posting of a
"forthcoming" bond requiring the surety to pay the plaintiff if the defendant fails to bring
forth the attached property for execution and sale in the event of a final judgment for the
plaintiff. Section 76.19, on the other hand, offers the defendant the option of posting a so-
called "satisfaction" or "payment" bond requiring the surety to pay the plaintiff the full
amount of any final judgments rendered in favor of the plaintiff if the defendant fails to do
SO.
Posting one of these bonds is often referred to as "rebonding" since the plaintiff was
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Alternatively, he may move to dissolve the attachment on the
ground that it was improperly issued. One reason for such a dissolu-
tion might be that the specific factual grounds alleged by the plain-
tiff are not true." The court is always open to hear such motions. If
the plaintiff fails to prove the truth of his allegations, the writ is
dissolved and the property returned or the lien discharged." If the
writ is so dissolved, the defendant may thereafter sue on the bond
to recover all costs and damages sustained in consequence of im-
proper attachment. If the defendant does not contest the validity of
the attachment, any property seized remains in the sheriff's custody
until final disposition of the plaintiff's action. If the plaintiff suc-
ceeds on the merits, he may satisfy his final judgment by having the
attached property sold on execution by the sheriff.'
C. Garnishment
The prejudgment garnishment provisions of chapter 77 are simi-
lar to those of attachment. 21 However, garnishment differs in that
it is used to reach debts due to the defendant by a third person, such
as nonexempt wages or bank accounts, for any tangible or intangible
property of the defendant in the possession of a third party, such
as a bailee.2' Any plaintiff in an action on a debt is entitled to a writ
of garnishment after posting a bond and filing a motion stating that
the debt is "just, due and unpaid," that the garnishment is not for
the purpose of injuring the defendant, and that the plaintiff believes
the defendant will not, after judgment, have sufficient visible prop-
erty on which a levy can be made to satisfy the claim.Y
originally required to post a bond as a condition precedent to issuance of the writ of attach-
ment. Id. § 76.12. For further discussion of the bonding and rebonding requirement, see notes
252-73 and accompanying text infra.
17. FLA. STAT. § 76.24 (1977). The defendant may also seek a writ of replevin if the
property attached is not subject to attachment as, for example, if it is exempt homestead
property.
18. Id. § 76.24(2). A jury may be demanded by either party, and if the defendant denies
the underlying debt, this issue shall be heard at the same time. Id. § 76.24(4).
19. Id. § 56.061.
20. Chapter 77 of the Florida Statutes also provides for postjudgment garnishment. Id.
§§ 77.01, .03.
21. Id. § 77.01.
22. Id. § 77.031. The plaintiff must also deposit $10 to be paid to the garnishee for the
payment of his attorney's fee in obtaining representation to respond to the writ. The balance
of the garnishee's actual expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee, is taxed as costs of
the action, ordinarily payable by the losing party. Id. § 77.28. Garnishment in Florida is not
restricted to situations involving a threat to the court's jurisdiction over the defendant or his
property. There does not seem to be any rational policy reason for the difference between the
availability of garnishment and attachment, and the difference is somewhat anomalous in
light of the historical development of the writs, which generally placed greater restrictions
on garnishment than on attachment. See Williams, supra note 9, at 63 n.25.
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The clerk issues the writ without hearing or notice to the defen-
dant, and the sheriff serves the writ on the named garnishee. The
writ commands the garnishee to disclose by answer within twenty
days any indebtedness to the defendant and any property belonging
to the defendant which is in the garnishee's possession or control.2
The garnishee is then required, in effect, to withhold and to retain,
pending final adjudication, any debt owing or property belonging to
the defendant, in an amount up to double the amount of the plain-
tiff's claim.2 ' As in the case of attachment, the defendant can obtain
the release of any debt or property garnished by posting a bond 2 or
he can move to have the writ dissolved on the basis of any untrue
allegation in the plaintiffs motion. 6
These allegations include, however, only the existence of the un-
paid debt and the plaintiffs belief, reasonably apprehended," in the
defendant's future inability to satisfy a judgment, as contrasted
with the more limited grounds upon which a writ of attachment may
issue.2 If the defendant successfully dissolves the garnishment, he
is entitled to any payments or property due from the garnishee, and
the defendant may have an action on the bond for any costs or
damages suffered as a result of the wrongful garnishment.2 ' If the
defendant does not contest the garnishment, or does so unsuccess-
fully, upon final judgment against him the garnished funds are ap-
plied to satisfy the judgment, with any excess paid over to the
defendant, and the garnishee's obligation to the defendant on the
debt or for the return of the property garnished is discharged. 0
23. FLA. STAT. § 77.04 (1977). The garnishee must also disclose whether he knows of any
other person indebted to the defendant or who may have possession of any property belonging
to the defendant. Id.
24. Id. § 77.19. The garnishee's liability extends to any indebtedness due or property held
at the time of service of the writ upon him or at any subsequent time until his answer is
served. Id. § 77.06. If the garnishee fails to answer the writ, a default judgment can be entered
against him for the full amount of any final judgment recovered by the plaintiff against the
defendant. Id. § 77.081.
25. Id. § 77.24. Again, such bond must be double the amount actually garnished, condi-
tioned to pay any final judgment entered against the defendant up to that amount. On motion
and notice to the plaintiff, the defendant may also request the court to release any sums
garnished in excess of an amount sufficient to satisfy the plaintiff's claim with interest and
costs. Id.
26. Id. § 77.07. The court is always open to hearing such motions, and the burden of proof
is on the plaintiff to prove the truth of his allegations.
27. See Bertman v. Kurtell & Co., 205 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967), in which
the court indicated that the plaintiff's belief must be supported by facts and that the plaintiff
must make reasonable inquiry to ascertain defendant's financial circumstances.
28. See note 14 supra.
29. PLA. STAT. § 77.031(2) (1977). The similar liability for improper attachment is dis-
cussed at notes 254-69 and accompanying text infra.
30. FLA. STAT. §§ 77.081(2), .083 (1977).
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D. Replevin
A third provisional remedy is the writ of replevin, commonly used
by secured creditors to obtain repossession of their collateral upon
default by the debtor.3' As such, the writ issues ex parte, resulting
in seizure of the property by the sheriff, thereby assuring its safety
pending the outcome of the trial on the merits.32 The procedure for
obtaining a prejudgment writ of replevin has historically been very
similar to that of the other provisional remedies. The writ is issued
by the clerk upon application of the plaintiff, accompanying the
filing of the complaint alleging the wrongful detention of the prop-
erty.u The plaintiff is also required to post a bond, in an amount
double the value of the property seized, conditioned to pay the
defendant the value of the property and any damages resulting from
the taking if the plaintiff fails to prevail on the merits.3 The sheriff
holds the replevied property for three days, during which time the
defendant has a right to recover the property by posting a forthcom-
ing bond.3s If no bond is posted, the sheriff delivers the property to
the plaintiff pending final judgment on the merits.m
I. THE SEARCH FOR A CONsTTUrTIONAL STANDARD
For many years it was settled law that the provisional remedies
permitting creditors to seize debtors' property, before final judg-
ment and without any prior notice or hearing, were constitutionally
valid. These remedies were viewed as merely part of the "process"
which was "due" under the fourteenth amendment. Where only
property rights were concerned, it was felt that the Constitution
required no more than an opportunity for a hearing and judicial
31. Section 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides that on default a secured
creditor has the right, unless waived in the security agreement, to repossess the collateral.
The creditor may use self-help in effecting repossession if it can be done without breach of
the peace. If judicial process is necessary, replevin is the proper procedure to recover the
collateral. See FLA. STAT. § 679.503 (1977). See generally 1 S. RmusiN, FLORiDA CREDIToRs'
RIGHTS MANUAL § 3.02B (1975 & Supp. 1977).
In addition to being a provisional remedy, replevin is the form of action for recovery of
personal property wrongfully detained by another and for any damages sustained by reason
of the wrongful taking or detention. See id. § 3.02A. The action can be maintained as an
ordinary action at law, resulting after full trial on the merits in a writ of possession awarding
the property to the plaintiff, together with a money judgment for damages, if any. See FLA.
STAT. §§ 78.18-.19 (1977). See generally 1 S. RAKUSIN, supra at § 3.06.
32. See FLA. STAT. §§ 78.065-.068 (1977). See generally 1 S. RAKusiN, supra note 31, at §
3.06.
33. The original Florida replevin statute, before the 1973 amendments, is typical. Act of
June 27, 1967, ch. 67-254, § 28, 1967 Fla. Laws 560 (repealed 1973).
34. See FLA. STAT. § 78.07 (1977).
35. See note 16 supra.
36. See FLA. STAT. § 78.13 (1977). This provision was not amended.
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determination at some stage of the proceedings. Thus, the initial
seizure of the debtor's property at the ex parte behest of the creditor
was found to satisfy due process even though the debtor was tempo-
rarily deprived of the use and enjoyment of his property pending
final judicial resolution of the merits of the creditor's claim. The
validity of these procedures was so well established, in fact, that
when the issue was presented to the Supreme Court in 1929, in
McKay v. McInnes, involving Maine's attachment statute, the
Court summarily upheld the statute in a per curiam opinion.3 7
A. Sniadach and Its Progeny
1. Sniadach
When Family Finance Corporation sued out its garnishment of
Mrs. Sniadach's wages, it could scarcely have anticipated the
Court's turnabout. As required under the Wisconsin statute, Family
Finance asserted that Mrs. Sniadach was in default on a promissory
note. The Wisconsin Supreme Court had rejected Mrs. Sniadach's
defenses, stressing the minimal nature of the deprivation both in
amount and duration, the opportunity to challenge promptly the
propriety of the garnishment, the remedies available for improper
garnishment, and "the long historical pedigree of the practice."3 s
Justice Douglas, writing for the majority on appeal, began by
noting that a procedural rule which may satisfy due process for
attachments in general does not necessarily satisfy due process in
every case. The issue, as he saw it, was whether the "interim freez-
ing of wages without a chance to be heard" violated due process.
Douglas then focused on the nature of the property seized-
wages-and observed that wages are "a specialized type of prop-
erty presenting distinct problems in our economic system. ' 3 Be-
cause of the tremendous hardship garnishment imposes on wage
earners with families, the creditor's leverage is enormous, Douglas
explained, and a prejudgment wage garnishment may "as a practi-
cal matter drive a wage-earning family to the wall." 0 Thus, he
concluded, the prejudgment garnishment of wages "absent notice
and a prior hearing"-to tender any defense he may have, whether
it be fraud or otherwise-violates the fundamental principles of due
process. Summary procedures, on the other hand, may well meet
37. 279 U.S. 820 (1929), aff'g 141 A. 699 (Me. 1928).
38. Clark & Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes and Beyond: The Creditor Meets the
Constitution, 59 VA. L. REv. 355, 356 (1973).
39. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969).
40. Id. at 341-42.
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the requirements of due process in "extraordinary situations," he
suggested, requiring special protection to a "state or creditor inter-
est,"4I' such as acquiring quasi-in-rem jurisdiction to adjudicate the
plaintiff's claim.
Justice Harlan, in a concurring opinion, chose to premise his deci-
sion on a broader ground than the special nature of wages.
"Fundamental fairness" and concepts of the "Anglo-American legal
heritage" are the judicial guideposts for giving content to the four-
teenth amendment,42 he hypothesized, and, apart from "special sit-
uations," due process is afforded only by notice and a prior hearing
"aimed at establishing the validity, or at least the probable validity,
of the underlying claim against the alleged debtor before he can be
deprived of his property or its unrestricted use." '4 3 The "property"
of which Mrs. Sniadach had been deprived was the use of her wages
pending final judgment, and Harlan could not characterize this
deprivation as de minimis.11
Justice Black dissented. Scoffing at Harlan's implicit adoption of
a "Natural Law concept" of due process, 5 he accused the majority
of usurping the power of the state legislature to decide, as a matter
of policy, when prejudgment garnishment ought to be available."
Black quoted with approval from the Supreme Court of Maine's
McKay opinion upholding the constitutionality of provisional credi-
tor remedies generally.
7
The ambivalent nature of the Sniadach decision left the lower
courts perplexed. Understandably, there was confusion as to
whether the prior notice and hearing requirement imposed by the
majority was confined to the prejudgment garnishment of wages and
other types of specialized property or whether it applied to the use
of provisional remedies generally.4 1 Perhaps in part because of this
confusion, it was not long before the Court chose to speak again, this
time in more unequivocal terms.
2. Fuentes
Fuentes v. Shevin 8.1 involved the seizure under Florida's re-
41. Id. at 339.
42. Id. at 342-43.
43. Id. at 343 (emphasis in original).
44. Id. at 342.
45. Id. at 351.
46. Id. at 345.
47. Id. at 348.
48. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 72 n.5 (1972).
48.1 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
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plevin statute" of a gas stove and a stereo purchased by Mrs.
Fuentes from Firestone Tire and Rubber Company under a condi-
tional sales contract. Under the contract, Firestone retained a pur-
chase money security interest in the goods and was entitled to re-
possess the goods if Mrs. Fuentes defaulted in her payments. Mrs.
Fuentes paid more than $400 on the contract. However, with only a
$200 balance outstanding, a dispute developed over the servicingof
the stove. When Mrs. Fuentes refused to make any more payments,
Firestone sued for repossession and caused the goods to be seized by
the sheriff under a writ of replevin, without affording Mrs. Fuentes
any prior notice or an opportunity to be heard. Mrs. Fuentes
brought suit to have the replevin statute declared unconstitutional,
but it was upheld by a three-judge federal district court.5 0 On appeal
to the Supreme Court, the case was consolidated with another ac-
tion challenging a similar Pennsylvania law. In a split decision, with
only seven justices sitting, the Court struck down both statutes.5
Speaking through Justice Stewart, the four-justice majority flatly
rejected the notion that Sniadach was limited to the "necessities"
of life. The majority concluded instead that Sniadach was "in the
mainstream of past cases. 52 The majority also dismissed quickly
the argument that there was not real "deprivation of property"
because the taking was only temporary and involved mere posses-
sion of the goods, citing Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in
Sniadach .5 3 As for the central issue of the requirements of due pro-
cess itself, the Court stated that "the right to notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard 'must be granted at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner.' "'
Since the purpose of due process is to minimize "substantively
unfair or mistaken deprivations of property" by the state, the Court
continued, the right to notice and a hearing must be granted before
the state authorizes its agents to seize property in the possession of
a person upon the application of another, since no later hearing or
damage award can undo an arbitrary taking. 5  The opinion did not
reach the question of the nature and form of such a prior hearing
beyond echoing Justice Harlan's observation in Sniadach that the
49. Act of June 27, 1967, ch. 67-254, § 28, 1967 Fla. Laws 560 (current version at FLA. STAT.
ch. 78 (1977)).
50. Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F. Supp. 954, 959 (S.D. Fla. 1970), rev'd sub nom. Fuentes
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
51. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (4-3 decision).
52. Id. at 88.
53. Id. at 86.
54. Id. at 80 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
55. Id. at 81-82.
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plaintiff must establish at least the probable validity of his underly-
ing claim.5
Firestone's argument that Mrs. Fuentes had contractually waived
her right to notice and a hearing was rejected by the Court on the
factual ground that the language of the contract was ambiguous and
thus did not satisfy the requirement set forth in D.H. Overmyer Co.
v. Frick Co. 57 that the waiver of a constitutional right must be made
knowingly as well as voluntarily and intelligently."
Finally, the Court recognized, as it had in Sniadach, that
"[tihere are 'extraordinary situations' which justify postponing
notice and opportunity for a hearing."5 1 These situations must, how-
ever, be "truly unusual," cautioned Justice Stewart. The additional
costs of a prior hearing in time, effort, and expense do not outweigh
the constitutional requirements since procedural due process is not
intended to promote efficiency. Such exceptions must be necessary
to secure an "important governmental or general public interest,"
evidencing a "special need for very prompt action," and the state
must keep "strict control" over the use of such force. 0 Prejudgment
replevin, he concluded, serves no such important governmental or
general public interest since only private gain is directly at stake.
He conceded, though, that there may be cases in which a creditor
could make a showing of immediate danger that a debtor will de-
stroy or conceal disputed goods.61
Although clarifying the scope of Sniadach, the Fuentes decision
raised a host of new questions about the nature and form of the
required preliminary hearing, the requisites of a valid contractual
waiver, if any, and the possible justification of some provisional
creditor remedies, especially attachment, under the extraordinary
circumstances exception. The decision provoked a strong dissent by
Justice White. He complained that a secured creditor with a secu-
rity interest or other lien, such as Firestone, also has a legitimate
"property" interest in the collateral which is as deserving of protec-
tion as the debtor's possessory interest. White argued that due pro-
56. Id. at 97.
57. 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
58. 407 U.S. at 94-95.
59. Id. at 90.
60. Id. at 90-92. As examples of such extraordinary situations, the Court cited Ewing v.
Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950) (protect public from misbranded drugs);
Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947) (protect public against disaster of bank failure);
Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931) (summary seizure to collect taxes); Central
Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554 (1921) (meet needs of war effort).
61. 407 U.S. at 93. Even in such a situation, the state must maintain effective control over
the use of summary power by reviewing the basis of the claim to repossession and evaluating
the need for immediate seizure. Id. at n.30.
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cess does not call for an inflexible procedure to be applied in every
situation but rather requires a balancing of the competing interests
in each set of circumstances. He would have found the statutory
procedures, requiring a bond and entitling the debtor to a prompt
postseizure hearing, sufficient. White was also critical of the result
from a pragmatic viewpoint, predicting that creditors would cir-
cumvent debtors' rights to a hearing by properly drafted contractual
waivers and that, in any event, few debtors would in fact ever ap-
pear at the hearing, although all would suffer from the increased
cost of collection which he assumed would be passed on by credi-
tors."6
3. Mitchell
Predictably, Fuentes touched off a flood of challenges to every
conceivable type of creditor remedy. Even where the extraordinary
situation exception might have applied on the facts, few statutes
were "narrowly drawn" to meet such unusual conditions. However,
the "Procrustean rule" 3 of Fuentes was short-lived. Less than two
years later, the Court spoke again in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co."
Mr. Mitchell had purchased a stove, refrigerator, washing ma-
chine, and stereo from Grant Company under an installment sales
contract on which there remained an overdue and unpaid balance
of $574.17. Grant Company filed suit on the debt and simultane-
ously obtained a writ of sequestration, without prior notice to
Mitchell or an opportunity for a hearing. The merchandise was
seized by the constable. Mitchell filed a motion to dissolve the writ
on the ground that the seizure violated due process. The Supreme
Court of Louisiana upheld the seizure . 5 In a five-to-four decision,
the United States Supreme Court affirmed."6
Justice White, who had dissented in Fuentes, wrote the majority
opinion in Mitchell. The majority did not overrule Fuentes but pur-
ported to distinguish it. White noted at the outset that, as in
Fuentes, both the buyer and the unpaid seller had "current, real
interests in the property . . . ." (Under the Louisiana Civil Code
an unpaid seller has a vendor's lien for the price even though he does
not retain title or obtain a consensual security interest.) 7 White
62. Id. at 102-03.
63. Justice Powell's appellation in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 628 (1974).
64. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
65. 269 So. 2d 186 (La. 1972), aff'd, 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
66. 416 U.S. 600.
67. See id. at 604. Under § 2-401(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code, a conditional
seller's retained title is treated as a security interest. See FLA. STAT. § 672.401(1) (1977).
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maintained that resolution of the due process question must take
this duality of interests into account.18 Moreover, he asserted, where
only property rights are involved, the usual rule permits the post-
ponement of a hearing until after the seizure, provided the oppor-
tunity for ultimate judicial determination of liability is adequate. 9
White then compared the statutory safeguards in the Louisiana
sequestration statute to those in the replevin statute held invalid in
Fuentes.
A number of factors were identified as significant. First, in apply-
ing for the writ in Louisiana, the creditor was required to allege by
specific factual affidavit the grounds which entitled him to the writ.
In contrast, mere conclusory allegations were required by the stat-
ute in Fuentes. Second, the factual issues raised by the application
in Louisiana-the existence of a lien and the debtor's default-were
narrowly confined and susceptible to documentary proof. The broad
fault standard involved in Fuentes-the wrongful detention of the
property-was inherently subjective and required adversarial input.
Third, the Louisiana writ could only be issued after a judicial deter-
mination that the factual allegations made by the creditor in his ex
parte application clearly demonstrated he was entitled to the writ.
Ministerial issuance of the writ by a clerk was allowed by the statute
in Fuentes.
Fourth, the creditor in Louisiana was liable to the debtor for
damages arising out of a wrongful seizure and was required to post
a bond for the payment of any such damages, including attorney's
fees. Fifth, the Louisiana statute expressly provided for an immedi-
ate postseizure hearing at which the creditor had the burden of
proving both his probability of success on the merits and the truth
of the allegations upon which the writ was issued. In Fuentes, it was
unclear under the Florida statute whether the debtor had an uncon-
ditional right to such hearing, who was required to initiate it, or
when the matter would be heard. Sixth, the Louisiana debtor was
entitled to the return of the property by posting his own bond,
whether or not he contested the validity of the initial seizure. 0
After cataloging these factors, Justice White concluded that the
Louisiana statutory scheme minimized the risk of a wrongful seizure
through judicial control of the entire process and that it protected
the debtor's interest "in every conceivable way" short of prior notice
and an opportunity to be heard before the seizure.7 Therefore, con-
68. 416 U.S. at 604.
69. Id. at 611.
70. Id. at 616-17.
71. Id. at 618.
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sidering the procedure as a whole, he was convinced that the state
had reached a "constitutional accommodation of the competing in-
terests" of the debtor and the creditor.72 A majority of the Court
agreed on this conclusion.
Concurring, Justice Powell stated that the decision "withdr[ew]
significantly from the full reach" of the principle that due process
requires an adversary hearing before a debtor may be temporarily
deprived of a possessory interest in property and that "to that ex-
tent" Fuentes was overruled.73 In his view, "[tihe determination of
what due process requires in a given context depends on a considera-
tion of both the nature of the governmental function involved and
the private interests affected."7 According to Powell, the state's
function in Mitchell was "to provide a reasonable and fair frame-
work of rules to facilitate commercial transactions on a credit
basis."7 5 The statute was designed to protect the legitimate interests
of both creditors and debtors.
In light of the obvious risk that a defaulting debtor may conceal,
convey, or destroy the collateral, as well as diminish its value by
continued use, Powell argued that a requirement of notice and a
hearing before sequestration would impose a serious risk that the
creditor might be deprived of his security. The state was entitled to
balance this risk against the debtor's interest in the uninterrupted
possession of the collateral. But although even a brief loss of the
household effects sequestered might cause significant inconveni-
ence, he said, it would hardly place the debtor in a situation of a
"brutal need," such as the loss of welfare support, where a prior
hearing is required.7 Given the various procedural safeguards iden-
tified in the majority opinion, he was confident that due process
was fully satisfied.77
Three justices-Douglas, Marshall, and Brennan-joined in a dis-
senting opinion by Justice Stewart. In their view, the case was
identical to Fuentes, the only perceivable difference being the
makeup of the Court.7" The dissenters were unpersuaded by the
majority's enumeration of statutory safeguards. The affidavit re-
quirement can be met by any plaintiff who "fills in the blanks on
[an] appropriate form," they contended, and does no more than
72. Id. at 610.
73. Id. at 623.
74. Id. at 624.
75. Id.
76. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970).
77. 416 U.S. at 624-25.
78. Id. at 635. Justices Powell and Rehnquist, appointed to the Court after Fuentes was
Argued, did not participate in the decision.
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test the strength of the plaintiff's own belief in his rights. "Whether
the issuing functionary be a judge or a clerk, he can do no more than
ascertain the formal sufficiency of the plaintiff's [application]
. . .'ll Finally, the dissenters could see no difference between the
issues found in Mitchell to be particularly suited to ex parte deter-
mination and those posed by the plaintiff's application in Fuentes. "
In short, they concluded, the case was "constitutionally indistin-
guishable" from Fuentes, and the Court had "simply rejected that
case and adopted instead the analysis of the Fuentes dissent."',
4. Di-Chem
Even before the lower courts and legal commentators had a
chance to sort out the relationship between Fuentes and Mitchell
or to decide whether or not the full panoply of Mitchell safeguards
was essential in every case, the Court handed down yet another
decision. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.,12 decided
only eight months after Mitchell, differed materially in two respects
from its predecessors: (1) it involved a commercial debtor rather
than an individual consumer debtor, and (2) it involved the garnish-
ment of a bank account rather than the repossession of collateral
already subject to a security interest.
Di-Chem sued North Georgia for goods sold and delivered on open
account in the amount of $51,279.17. Simultaneously, and without
notice to North Georgia or a hearing, Di-Chem obtained a writ of
garnishment which was served on the First National Bank of Dal-
ton. After first obtaining release of the garnished funds by posting
a bond, North Georgia moved to dismiss the garnishment and re-
lease the bond on the ground that the statutory procedure violated
due process. The state courts upheld the garnishment, reasoning
that Sniadach merely carved out an exception in favor of wage
earners 83
The Court held the garnishment unconstitutional. Justice White
spoke for the majority in a six-to-three decision. First, he rejected
the argument that only consumers who are the victims of adhesion
contracts are protected: "It may be that consumers deprived of
household appliances will more likely suffer irreparably than corpo-
79. Id. at 632-33.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 634.
82. 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
83. 194 S.E.2d 508 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972), aff'd, 201 S.E.2d 321 (Ga. 1973), rev'd, 419 U.S.
601 (1975). Subsequently, a three-judge federal court declared the same statute unconstitu-
tional. Morrow Elec. Co. v. Cruse, 370 F. Supp. 639 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
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rations deprived of bank accounts, but the probability of irreparable
injury in the latter case is sufficiently great so that some procedures
are necessary to guard against the risk of initial error."' 4
On the matter of what procedures are necessary to satisfy due
process, the Di-Chem opinion may be more significant for what
Justice White and the majority did not say. White spurned without
a word the premise he had so carefully nurtured in Fuentes and
Mitchell as justification for postponing the hearing until after sei-
zure-that a lien creditor has a present, real "property" interest in
the goods as equally deserving of protection as the debtor's posses-
sory interest. Instead, he used the same "saving characteristics"
analysis developed in Mitchell-despite the fact that the creditor
had absolutely no present interest in the garnished funds. Finding
that the writ was issued by a clerk based on mere conclusory allega-
tions and, moreover, that there was no provision for an early hear-
ing, at least without filing a bond, Justice White quickly concluded
that the statute was not "saved" by Mitchell.85 Thus, Di-Chem is
not a clear holding that a Mitchell analysis is applicable to the
prejudgment seizure of property not subject to a preexisting lien.
Nevertheless, that is the unmistakable implication of the case.8
The majority opinion in Di-Chem also further clouds the status
of Fuentes, which was considered to be overruled by a majority of
the justices in Mitchell.8 7 Justice White's opinion, on the other
hand, seems to give Fuentes renewed vitality. This is especially
perplexing in light of his past rejection of the emphasis in Fuentes
on the necessity for a preseizure hearing. Nevertheless, White stated
conspicuously that the Georgia Supreme Court "failed to take ac-
count of Fuentes." In the next breath, though, he recast the rule of
Fuentes as prohibiting seizures without the opportunity for a prior
hearing "or other safeguard against mistaken repossession.
'88
If this was an oblique effort to reconcile Fuentes and Mitchell, it
is not very convincing. The lip service to Fuentes did, however,
evoke a response from Justice Stewart: "It is gratifying to note that
my report [dissenting in Mitchell] of the demise of Fuentes v.
Shevin [citations omitted] seems to have been greatly exaggerated.
Cf. S. Clemens, cable from Europe to the Associated Press, quoted
in 2 A. Paine, Mark Twain: A Biography 1039 (1912). '' 9
84. 419 U.S. at 608.
85. Id. at 607.
86. See TeSelle & Love, Attachment, Garnishment, Replevin, and Self-Help Repossession
in Oklahoma, 30 OKLA. L. R~v. 253, 260 (1977).
87. 416 U.S. at 623.
88. 419 U.S. at 605-06.
89. Id. at 608 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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Justice Powell, who, with Justice White and the minority in
Mitchell, became a majority in Di-Chem, concurred in the result
but expressly rejected the reasoning of the majority opinion because
it "appears to resuscitate Fuentes."90 In Powell's opinion, the state
has a legitimate interest in facilitating creditor recovery through
prejudgment garnishment and attachment remedies, and prior no-
tice and an opportunity to be heard before seizure are "antithetical
to the very purpose" of such remedies." However, he agreed with
the majority in Di-Chem that the Georgia garnishment statute
failed to afford fundamental fairness in its accommodation of the
respective interests of creditors and debtors. It authorized the issu-
ance of the writ on the basis of a conclusory affidavit "insufficient
to enable a neutral officer to make even the most superficial prelimi-
nary assessment of the creditor's need. 9 2 In addition, the Georgia
statute failed to provide a prompt postseizure hearing in which the
creditor has "the burden of showing probable cause to believe there
is need to continue the garnishment" pending the final outcome on
the merits.93 Justice Powell did not believe it necessary for a judge
to issue the writ, saying a clerk is sufficient. 4 But he went beyond
the majority by indicating that the debtor should have an absolute
right to a return of the property by posting adequate security."
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Rehnquist and Burger, dis-
sented. They found the safeguards provided by the Georgia statute
adequate "in the commercial world."96 They also decried the con-
fusion imposed on "those who owe and those who lend" by "a waver-
ing tribunal off in Washington." '7
5. Carey
When Curtis Circulation Company sued Wrestling Revue, Inc. to
recover an unpaid debt and attached $24,374 due Revue under a
contract with National Sports Publishing Corporation, the stage
was set for a further and final (to date) consideration of provisional
remedies by the Supreme Court in Carey v. Sugar.", Under the New
York statute, the writ of attachment was ordered by a judge upon
Curtis' factual affidavit alleging fraud, one of the statutory grounds
90. Id. at 609 (Powell, J., concurring).
91. Id. at 610-11.
92. Id. at 612.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 611 n.3.
95. Id. at 612.
96. Id. at 619 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
97. Id.
98. 425 U.S. 73 (1976).
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for attachment, together with a bond indemnifying the defendant
if it prevailed on the merits. Although the New York statute ac-
corded the defendant the right to move for dissolution of the attach-
ment on the ground that it was unnecessary to the plaintiff's secu-
rity or, alternatively, to have the attachment discharged by posting
adequate security, Revue did neither. Instead, Revue brought an
action to have the statute declared unconstitutional and the attach-
ment vacated.
A three-judge federal district court held that the New York stat-
ute violated due process because it did not provide the defendant
with an adequate opportunity to vacate the attachment. The post-
seizure hearing appeared to the court to be limited to the question
of whether the attachment was necessary to the plaintiff's security
and not to the broader question of whether the plaintiff was likely
to prevail at the trial on the merits." The precise scope of the pre-
liminary hearing, however, was unclear as a matter of state law.
State officials, joined as parties defendant by Revue, insisted that
the New York law, as construed, required the attaching plaintiff to
demonstrate the probable merits of his underlying claim.' On di-
rect appeal, the Supreme Court held that, under the circumstances,
the lower court should have abstained from deciding the constitu-
tional question until definitive construction of the New York law
could be obtained from the state courts.
0'
Despite the lack of a decision in Carey on the constitutionality of
the New York statute, several observations are pertinent. First,
implicit in the remand was a determination that an "adequate"
postseizure hearing would be constitutionally sufficient-even
though Curtis had no preexisting interest in the property attached.
Thus, the Court tacitly concluded that a Mitchell analysis of the
statute's "saving characteristics" was appropriate, thereby dispel-
ling any lingering doubt as to the application of this analysis to
seizures of property not subject to a prior lien. 02 Also of signifi-
99. Sugar v. Curtis Circulation Co., 383 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd on other
grounds sub nor. Carey v. Sugar, 425 U.S. 73 (1976). The terminology is confusing because
under New York procedure, debts due to the defendant are "attached" rather than
"garnished."
100. In support of their contention, they cited Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated
Soviet Republic, 138 N.E. 24, 26 (N.Y. 1923); Regnell v. Page, 369 N.Y.S.2d 936, 941 (Sup.
Ct. 1975); New York Auction Co. v. Belt, 368 N.Y.S.2d 98, 101 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
101. Carey v. Sugar, 425 U.S. 73 (1976). The Supreme Court noted that the district court
also had found the New York statute deficient because the burden of proof at the hearing
would be on the defendant rather than on the plaintiff as apparently required in Mitchell,
but did not consider the question further. Id. at 77 n.2.
102. The Supreme Court obviously was conscious of this question since it observed that
the lower court had noted the fact. Id.
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cance in the case was the emergence of the "constitutional stand-
ard" that the postseizure hearing must inquire into the likelihood
of the plaintiff's ultimately prevailing on the merits of his claim, at
least where the issue is raised by the defendant. °0 In its previous
decisions the Court had studiously avoided any meaningful discus-
sion of the precise nature of the questions to be considered at the
postseizure hearing, other than Justice Harlan's passing reference
in Sniadach to "probable validity" of the underlying claim,'0 4
echoed in Fuentes,0 5 and Justice White's reference in Mitchell to
the fact that the Louisiana statute required the plaintiff to prove the
truth of the allegations upon which the writ has been granted.0
Yet the Court in Carey adopted this previously unarticulated
"constitutional standard" without discussion-beyond naked recog-
nition-and without comment on the altogether different question
clearly mandated by the New York statute for consideration at the
preliminary hearing, namely the necessity of the attachment to the
plaintiff's security pending the final outcome on the merits. There
is not the slightest indication in the per curiam opinion whether or
not this question must also be dealt with at the preliminary hearing,
as suggested twice by Justice Powell in his concurring opinions in
Mitchell'"' and Di-Chem, 0 1 or whether probable success on the mer-
its is the sole issue for determination at the postseizure hearing.
Thus, the precise scope of inquiry constitutionally mandated at the
postseizure hearing remains cloudy beyond the plaintiff's burden to
demonstrate his probability of success on the merits.""9
B. The Present Constitutional Standard
In spite of Fuentes' tenacity as authority, a clear majority of the
Court seems committed to the view that when only property rights
are involved, due process does not compel a hearing prior to seizure
but is satisfied by a prompt postseizure hearing coupled with such
additional procedural safeguards as are deemed adequate to mini-
mize the risk of mistake and the impact of wrongful seizure. Accord-
103. Id. at 77.
104. 395 U.S. at 343.
105. 407 U.S. at 97.
106. 416 U.S. at 618.
107. Id. at 626-27.
108. 419 U.S. at 613.
109. See Northeast Inv. Co. v. Leisure Living Communities, Inc., 351 A.2d 845, 851-52
(Me. 1976), in which the court construed the standard of "likelihood of success" on the merits
to mean that the claim is "not of such insubstantial character that its invalidity so clearly
appears as to foreclose a reasonable possibility of recovery." The term connotes "mere proba-
bility of success or a favorable chance of success" but need not take the form of a full
adjudication on the merits. Id.
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ingly, Mitchell's "saving characteristics" constitute a separate and
independent basis against which to test the validity of creditor rem-
edies, although of course a Fuentes-type preliminary hearing before
seizure remains constitutionally acceptable.
Today, even when the creditor has no preexisting lien or other
interest in the property, reliance on the Mitchell standard appears
comfortably established, despite its original premise and lack of
forthright articulation by the Court. Under this analysis, it is not
necessary to invoke the extraordinary situation "exception" to
Fuentes in order to justify a prehearing seizure. The Court already
has determined that on balance a state's interest in providing a fair
and reasonable system of effective creditor remedies, including pre-
hearing seizures, outweighs the interest of debtors in uninterrupted
possession and enjoyment of their property, provided that the risk
of error and adverse impact on the debtor are minimized."" On the
other hand, Di-Chem and Carey dispelled any doubt that the princi-
ples enunciated in these cases are confined to individual consumer
debtors. Commercial debtors, too, are entitled to the full protection
of due process.
The narrow holding of Sniadach remains intact and creates an
exception in favor of wage earners. The prejudgment garnishment
of a debtor's wages-a special type of property-must be preceded
by notice and a hearing."' This exception perhaps may be extended
to cover a few other types of property seizure of which would place
the debtor in "brutal need.""'
One additional issue has caused some confusion and disagree-
ment among the lower courts. All the cases decided so far by the
Supreme Court have involved an actual seizure of tangible personal
property which interfered with the debtor's present possessory inter-
est. When real property is attached, however, the "seizure" usually
takes the form of a lien or charge on the property."3 Such a lien does
110. Conversely, extraordinary seizures effected before hearing under the Fuentes excep-
tion, such as to obtain quasi-in-rem jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, apparently
must exhibit the saving characteristics approved in Mitchell. This seems implicit in Fuentes'
requirement that the state keep close control over such exceptional use of its power. See
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. at 90-93.
111. See North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. at 611 n.2 (Powell, J.,
concurring); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. at 614. But see 419 U.S. at 608 ("We are
no more inclined now than we have been in the past to distinguish among different kinds of
property in applying the Due Process Clause."); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. at 89-90.
112. See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. at 625 (Powell, J., concurring). The term
was first applied to the termination of welfare benefits in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,
261 (1970), aff'g Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 899-900 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
113. Traditionally, a levy on real property was accomplished by some overt act constitut-
ing a trespass on the property, manifesting an interference with the debtor's right of posses-
sion, often accompanied by posting a notice of levy to put third parties on notice of the levy.
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not dispossess the debtor from the property or interfere with his use
or enjoyment."' He may even sell or mortgage the property, but the
purchaser or mortgagee takes title subject to the lien. Theref,:)re, the
purchase price or loan value of the property is usually diminished
and, on occasion, its marketability is destroyed altogether.
The question is whether the placing of a nonpossessory lien
against the debtor's property constitutes the "deprivation" of a sub-
stantial "property" interest invoking due process protection. Sev-
eral lower courts have held that it does,"' stressing the lien's sub-
stantial economic effects-as on the property's marketability. Such
a lien may also affect the debtor's credit rating and is a burden
which the debtor must take some initiative to remove.
However, there is some authority to the contrary, particularly
involving mechanics' liens."' These cases reason that the lien does
not prevent the owner from selling the property and that the effect
of the lien may be ameliorated through bonding."7 In theory, it
would seem impossible to distinguish an attachment lien from a
mechanics' lien in the nature of the "property" interests involved
or the economic consequences. If they are to be accorded different
protection under the due process clause, more rationally it should
flow from the greater weight assigned to the state's interest in pro-
tecting the claims of workmen or perhaps from the lesser weight
assigned to the interest of the owner who impliedly consented to the
lien when he contracted for the work.
1. The Saving Characteristics
The Mitchell analysis itself raises many questions. First, it is not
clear whether all the saving characteristics must be present in every
See 13 FLA. JUR. Executions § 41 (1957). FLA. STAT. § 76.14 (1977) provides that the attach-
ment lien becomes binding on subsequent judgment creditors and purchasers only from the
time notice of the levy is properly recorded. Although not entirely free from doubt, today such
recordation alone appears sufficient to constitute a levy on real property. See O'Flarity v.
Gurley, 22 Fla. Supp. 196, rev'd on rehearing, 30 Fla. Supp. 186 (Fla. 4th Cir. Ct. 1964) (levy
valid).
114. FLA. STAT. § 76.14 (1977); see Florida Ins. Exch. v. Adler, 174 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1965).
115. See, e.g., Terranova v. Avco Financial Serv., 396 F. Supp. 1402, 1406 (D. Vt. 1975);
Hutchison v. Bank of North Carolina, 392 F. Supp. 888, 894 (M.D.N.C. 1975).
116. See, e.g., Spielman-Fond, Inc. v. Hanson's, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 997, 999 (D. Ariz.
1973); Cook v. Carlson, 364 F. Supp. 24, 27 (S.D.S.D. 1973).
117. See FLA. STAT. §§ 76.18 (forthcoming bond), .19 (satisfaction bond) (1977). Gener-
ally, posting a satisfaction bond operates to release the property from the attachment lien,
while posting a forthcoming bond does not. See D. EPSTEIN & J. LANDERS, DEBTORS AND
CREDrroRs 7-8 (1978). The Florida Supreme Court, however, seems to have taken the position
that an attachment lien is not released by filing a satisfaction bond. Cowart v. Venable, 98
So. 219 (Fla. 1923).
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case or whether some are merely desirable but not essential. If some
are not essential, which ones are essential or in what mix? The
formulation of the standard itself suggests that it is not the factors
individually, but the overall effect, which is dispositive.
In Mitchell, for instance, Justice White repeated the familiar lit-
any that the requirements of due process "are not technical, nor is
any particular form of procedure necessary" and that the very na-
ture of due process "negates any concept of inflexible procedures
universally applicable to every imaginable situation."' ", He then
concluded: "Considering the Louisiana procedure as a whole, we are
convinced that the State has reached a constitutional accomodation
of the respective interests of buyer and seller.""' 9
To the same effect was Justice Powell's conclusion in Di-Chem
that it was the "combination" of deficiencies which he considered
fatal to the Georgia garnishment statute.'2 ° As to the possible omis-
sion of any of the enumerated characteristics, it may be noted that
at one time or another a majority of the present justices have re-
jected the notion that a judge, rather than a clerk, must review the
creditor's ex parte application and issue the writ.' At the other end
of the spectrum, Justice Powell has referred to the need for an early
hearing as the "most compelling" factor. 22
a. Factual Affidavit
Turning to the specific requirements of Mitchell, the plaintiff
must make a specific factual showing, by sworn affidavit or verified
pleading, of the "grounds" entitling him to the writ.2 3 Justice Pow-
ell, in his concurring opinion, framed this requirement somewhat
differently. He spoke in terms of a specific factual showing of
"probable cause to believe" that the creditor is entitled to the
writ. "' 4 Since the statutory grounds for issuing a writ are usually
stated in conclusory terms, while the creditor's affidavit is to be
factual, "probable cause" may refer to the judge's preliminary de-
termination that the statutory grounds are met by the facts alleged,
subject to later proof at the postseizure adversary hearing.
118. 416 U.S. at 610.
119. Id. (emphasis added).
120. 419 U.S. at 613 (Powell, J., concurring).
121. Id. at 611 n.3; id. at 619 (Blackmun, Rehnquist, & Burger, JJ., dissenting).
122. Id. at 613 (Powell, J., concurring).
123. 416 U.S. at 616. The reference to "grounds" presumably means those grounds speci-
fled in the statute defining the circumstances under which the writ can be issued. Nowhere
in the majority opinion is anything further said as to any constitutional restrictions on such
grounds, and apparently this is for the state to decide as a matter of substantive policy.
124. Id. at 625.
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However, in Di-Chem, Justice Powell again chose somewhat dif-
ferent words. There he spoke of the affidavit's providing a factual
basis for the "need" to resort to the writ as a means of preventing
removal or dissipation of assets required to satisfy the creditor's
claim. 2 ' He then went on to say that at the postseizure hearing the
creditor must show "probable cause to believe" there is a "need"
to continue the garnishment. 26 In an accompanying footnote he
indicated that the initial showing of probable inability to collect the
debt absent the issuance of the writ "need [not] be elaborate."' 27
All this seems to suggest that there is some constitutional restric-
tion on the "grounds" for invoking the provisional remedies, and it
is not left entirely to the discretion of the state. Although not articu-
lated as a necessary condition, implicit in Mitchell's balancing pro-
cess is the necessity for a genuine need on the part of the creditor
for summary seizure. Absent a compelling need, the balance would
seem to swing inexorably in favor of according the debtor notice and
an opportunity to be heard before seizure.
In Mitchell itself, for example, Justice White emphasized the
creditor's need for summary seizure of the goods since under Loui-
siana law the seller's lien was lost upon transfer of possession by the
buyer.' In such circumstances, he continued, "[tihe danger of
destruction or alienation cannot be guarded against if notice and a
hearing before seizure are supplied [since] the notice itself may
furnish a warning to the debtor acting in bad faith." '129 The state is
entitled, White concluded, to recognize the "reality" of the situation
and to provide the creditor adequate protection.'3 The Louisiana
statute upheld in Mitchell was narrowly drawn, limited to those
situations where it was within the "power" of the debtor to transfer,
conceal, or waste the property, or to remove it from the jurisdic-
tion.
3'
Thus, it appears doubtful whether summary seizure can be justi-
fied unless prior notice or the time needed for a preliminary hearing
pose a real danger to the plaintiff's interest. 32 On the other hand,
125. 419 U.S. at 611 (Powell, J., concurring).
126. Id. at 612.
127. Id. at n.5.
128. 416 U.S. at 609.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 608.
131. Id. at 605. Under the Louisiana statute, it is the debtor's "power" to impair the
creditor's security, not the creditor's apprehension that he will do so, which triggers the right
to sequestration. Id. at n.4.
132. Only Justice Powell has expressly articulated the requirement of a factual basis for
such a need. North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. at 611 (Powell, J., concur-
ring).
1978] 1257
1258 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:1233
it seems permissible for a state, in formulating its policy, to take
into account the power of the debtor to affect the property rather
than the impending exercise of such power. In effect this means that
the state may, in deciding the grounds for provisional relief, pre-
sume that at least some debtors in possession will act in bad faith.
Accordingly, summary seizure (with Mitchell safeguards) can be
provided without the necessity of proof in each case of an actual
likelihood of loss to the creditor.
The Court in Mitchell also stressed the fact that the factual issues
raised by the creditor's affidavit, and thus, by reflection, the issues
framed by the grounds of the Louisiana statute, were narrow and
uncomplicated. In particular, they did not raise subjective issues,
such as fault or intent, which are subject to "factual deternination"
and "documentary proof."' 3 Since many state statutes include the
debtor's fraudulent removal or conveyance of his property as one
ground for granting prejudgment relief, this requirement might pose
a stumbling block, and one lower court has so held.'3'
This result is somewhat anomalous in light of the purpose of the
provisional remedies. In addition, it involves a situation in which
summary seizure is most necessary to and prior notice most destruc-
tive of the creditor's interest. Thus, a strong argument can be made
that in the fraud situation the state's interest in providing creditors
with an ex parte remedy outweighs the added risk of error resulting
from the subjective nature of fraud.
b. Ex Parte Judicial Supervision
There is some doubt as to the constitutional necessity of having
the writ issued by a judge rather than a clerk. Justice White felt that
anyone less than a full judicial officer would leave the debtor "at
the unsupervised mercy of the creditor and court functionaries.'
'3 5
Justice Powell, though, specifically rejected this requirement in his
concurring opinion in Di-Chem. He would entrust the preliminary
ex parte review of the creditor's application to any "neutral officer
or magistrate.' 1
36
133. 416 U.S. at 617-18.
134. Sugar v. Curtis Circulation Co., 383 F. Supp. 643, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd on other
grounds sub norn. Carey v. Sugar, 425 U.S. 73 (1976). The Supreme Court did not even
mention the fact that the writ had been issued on the ground of fraud. This suggests that
the Court no longer considers it material or at least that it is of little weight in the overall
balancing process.
135. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. at 616.
136. 419 U.S. at 611 n.3. At one time or another, seven justices have rejected the judge-
clerk distinction. See also id. at 614 (Blackmun, Rehnquist, & Burger, JJ., dissenting);
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. at 632 (Stewart, Douglas, & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
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Whether a clerk is sufficient probably turns on the nature of his
office. Justice White found that approval of the creditor's applica-
tion was not, as decried by the dissent, a "mere ministerial act," but
involved a proper evaluation of the grounds, thus implying that
some degree of judgment and discretion is required.'37 In 1975, in
Hutchison v. Bank of North Carolina, the federal district court held,
in a very able opinion, that the writ could be issued by a clerk, at
least where he was "a judicial officer and not a mere administrative
functionary.' ' 38 Thus, this issue may turn on the nature of the office
of the clerk of the court under the law and the practice of each
jurisdiction.
c. Indemnity Bond
The posting of a bond or other adequate security by the creditor
for the payment of all expenses and damages'39 occasioned by a
wrongful seizure is already required by many provisional remedy
statutes. Under the Mitchell analysis, the purpose of the bond is to
minimize the adverse impact on the debtor in the event of error. By
imposing a direct and substantial cost on the creditor, in the form
of the bond premium, the requirement also serves to check unneces-
sary, as well as unwarranted, resort to prejudgment process as a
means of harassment. The bond approved in Mitchell was also con-
ditioned to cover the reasonable attorney's fees incurred by the
debtor in obtaining release of the property.' However, this factor
has not been stressed subsequently by the courts. The bond need
only be "adequate," and the exact amount apparently may be left
to the judge's discretion.
137. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. at 616 n.12. Compare id. at 632-33 (Stewart,
J., dissenting). Justice Powell referred to this function as at least a "superficial preliminary
assessment" of the creditor's assertions. North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S.
at 612 (Powell, J., concurring).
138. 392 F. Supp. 888, 896 (M.D.N.C. 1975). The court found, under North Carolina law
and practice, that the clerk exercised a judicial function. See also Manning v. Palmer, 381
F. Supp. 713 (D. Ariz. 1974) (justice of the peace a ministerial office); Union Barge Line Corp.
v. Marble Cliff Quarries Co., 374 F. Supp. 834 (S.D.W. Va. 1974) (clerk without authority);
Thornton v. Carson, 533 P.2d 657 (Ariz. 1975) (clerk without independent discretion). This
issue was considered briefly by the Florida Supreme Court in Phillips v. Guin & Hunt, Inc.,
344 So. 2d 568, 574 n.7 (Fla. 1977), discussed at note 244 and accompanying text infra.
139. In Louisiana, such damages include compensation for loss of use of the property (not
restricted to pecuniary loss) and injury to reputation and social standing, as well as humilia-
tion. Reasonable attorney's fees may be included in recoverable expenses. See Mitchell v.
W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. at 606 n.8.
140. Id. at 606, 617.
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d. Prompt Postseizure Hearing
The right to a prompt postseizure adversary hearing is an essen-
tial saving characteristic of Mitchell."' Indeed, Justice Powell has
said that a prompt and adequate postseizure hearing is the "most
compelling" of the Mitchell safeguards."' The debtor's right to be
heard after seizure must be unqualified and cannot be conditioned
on the posting of a bond or other security, as provided in the Georgia
garnishment statute invalidated in Di-Chem. 1
3
On the other hand, it seems clear that the debtor may be required
to take the initiative in requesting a hearing. The Louisiana statute
upheld in Mitchell, for example, provided for a hearing upon the
defendant's motion to dissolve the writ."' This is consistent with the
general notion that when only property rights are involved, rather
than personal liberty, due process merely affords the parties an
opportunity to be heard and does not impose a mandatory obliga-
tion that the taking be judicially reviewed, even if no objection is
made.
If the debtor does request a postseizure hearing, though, the mat-
ter must be heard promptly. In this regard, Justice White con-
trasted Mitchell's right to an "immediate" hearing under the Louis-
iana sequestration statute with Mrs. Fuentes' right to an "eventual"
hearing under the Florida replevin statute.'" There is scant author-
ity on what is constitutionally "prompt," but it seems safe to say
that at least a few days delay is permissible in order to give notice
of the hearing, and probably any form of accelerated docketing of
such hearings will suffice.
It is clear that the burden of proof at the hearing must be on the
creditor to show that he was entitled to the writ, not on the debtor
to show that the creditor was not.'"1 It is not so clear just what the
141. See, e.g., Guzman v. Western State Bank, 516 F.2d 125 (8th Cir. 1975); Garner v.
Tri-State Dev. Co., 382 F. Supp. 377 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Garcia v. Krausse, 380 F. Supp. 1254
(S.D. Tex. 1974); Massey-Ferguson Credit Corp. v. Peterson, 524 P.2d 1066 (Idaho 1974);
Vath v. Israel, 364 N.Y.S.2d 97 (Sup. Ct. 1975). But see Woods v. Tennessee, 378 F. Supp.
1364 (W.D. Tenn. 1974) (personal ex parte creditor appearance and expedited trial sufficient
without postseizure hearing).
142. North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. at 613 (Powell, J., concurring).
143. Id.
144. LA. CODE Civ. PRo. ANN. art. 3506 (West 1961), referred to by the Court, 416 U.S. at
618.
145. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. at 618.
146. See Justice White's statements in Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 618, and in Di-Chem, 419
U.S. at 607, and Justice Powell's, 416 U.S. at 625 (concurring), and 419 U.S. at 611-12
(concurring). The burden of proof was held crucial by the district court in striking down the
New York attachment statute. Sugar v. Curtis Circulation Co., 383 F. Supp. 643, 648
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Carey v. Sugar, 425 U.S. 73 (1976).
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creditor must prove. In Mitchell, Justice White said that the issue
at the preliminary hearing concerns the possession of the property
pending trial-which turns on the existence of the statutory grounds
for the writ.'47 The creditor, he added, needs to establish only the
probability that his case will succeed in order to justify the sei-
zure.'48 In Di-Chem, White noted that the Louisiana statute upheld
in Mitchell required the creditor to prove the grounds on which the
writ had issued, thus striking down the Georgia statute because
there was "no provision for an early hearing at which the creditor
would be required to demonstrate at least probable cause for the
garnishment.'
' 49
Justice Powell, in his concurring opinions, stated the requirement
somewhat differently. In Mitchell, he said that the creditor had to
make an ex parte, preseizure showing of "probable cause to believe
that he is entitled to the relief requested," followed promptly after
seizure by a hearing "to determine the merits of the controversy."'5
Later, in Di-Chem, Powell referred to the creditor's burden of show-
ing "probable cause to believe there is a need to continue the gar-
nishment . . . ."I" Presumably, this need is established if the sta-
tutory grounds for the writ are found to exist.'52
In sum, it appears that the creditor must prove the factual exis-
tence of the statutory grounds alleged in his motion for summary
seizure as well as a factual basis for his underlying claim. These
requirements are consistent with the overall rationale of Mitchell
that the state may constitutionally seize property without a prior
hearing if, and only if, it is necessary, on balance, to protect a
legitimate state need. 53 This conclusion is not jeopardized by
Carey, in which the Court stressed the requirement that the creditor
demonstrate his likelihood of success on the merits of the underlying
claim when factual issues are raised on a motion to vacate the
147. 416 U.S. at 609. Later, Justice White reemphasized that the Louisiana law expressly
provides for an immediate hearing and dissolution of the writ "unless the plaintiff proves the
grounds upon which the writ was issued," quoting from article 3506 of the Louisiana Code of
Civil Procedure. 416 U.S. at 618.
148. 416 U.S. at 609.
149. 419 U.S. at 607.
150. 416 U.S. at 625. It is not entirely clear whether."controversy" refers to the existence
of the statutory grounds upon which the writ was issued or to the merits of the plaintiff's
underlying claim. The context suggests that Justice Powell intended to refer to the existence
of the statutory grounds.
151. 419 U.S. at 612.
152. See notes 123-34 and accompanying text supra.
153. See 416 U.S. at 608-10. The Court in Mitchell recognized the legitimacy of the state's
need for effective creditor remedies when there is a real danger of loss or destruction of the
debtor's property.
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attachment.'15 This same concern was expressed by Justice Stewart
in Fuentes when he said that the creditor must establish "'at least
the probable validity . . of the underlying claim' since the essen-
tial reason for a preliminary hearing is to prevent unfair and mis-
taken deprivations of property. 5 1 Therefore, when property is seized
without a prior hearing, the debtor has a right to challenge the
legality of the seizure with respect to the probable merits of the
underlying claim as well as the factual existence of the statutory
grounds for seizure.
e. Rebond
The final saving characteristic of Mitchell was the debtor's abso-
lute right to return of the property upon posting a bond.'56 Although
not stressed in Mitchell, this requirement seemed to gain added
significance in Di-Chem when Justice Powell pointed out that, in a
garnishment situation, the funds impressed usually bear "no rela-
tion to the controversy giving rise to the alleged debt," and therefore
the state should give the debtor an opportunity to free those funds
by posting adequate security.'57 Such rebonding provisions are quite
common.' As a matter of policy, there does not seem to be any
reason not to permit the debtor to substitute security. Several lower
courts have, nevertheless, held that it is not essential. 59
2. Waiver of Due Process
The issue of waiver also must be considered. It is clear that, in
theory, constitutional rights may be waived-even in advance. Be-
cause the use of provisional creditor remedies so often arises out of
a preexisting contractual relationship between the debtor and the
creditor, it is not surprising that creditors use their superior bargain-
ing position to extract contractual waivers, especially from individ-
ual consumer debtors. The issue arose in Fuentes, but the Court
disposed of the question on the factual ground that the waiver
clause was ambiguous and, being construed against the creditor who
drafted it, ineffective.""0 Since future creditors will obviously be able
154. 425 U.S. at 78.
155. 407 U.S. at 97 (quoting Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. at 343 (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
156. 416 U.S. at 607.
157. 419 U.S. at 612 (Powell, J., concurring).
158. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 76.18-.19 (attachment), 77.24 (garnishment) (1977).
159. See, e.g., Woods v. Tennessee, 378 F. Supp. 1364 (W.D. Tenn. 1974) (pre-Di-Chem);
Doran v. Home Mart Bldg. Centers, Inc., 213 S.E.2d 825 (Ga. 1975) (no discussion).
160. 407 U.S. at 95-96.
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to correct this deficiency by proper draftsmanship, it is necessary
to consider the effectiveness of such waivers.
The leading case on waiver of constitutional rights is D.H. Over-
myer Co. v. Frick Co., "I in which the Supreme Court in 1972 upheld
a cognovit note in which the debtor had waived its constitutional
rights to notice and an opportunity to be heard in the event of
default.' However, the facts of the case were not typical. The
debtor was a business corporation with substantial bargaining
power and financial sophistication. The creditor had specifically
bargained for the cognovit provision, and the debtor received sub-
stantial benefits from agreeing to it. Applying the standards govern-
ing waiver of constitutional rights in a criminal proceeding, al-
though not ruling that such standards must necessarily apply, the
Court held that on that facts of the case the contractual waiver of
due process rights was made "voluntarily, intelligently, and know-
ingly.' 16 3 It was not, the Court pointed out, a "contract of adhesion"
resulting from unequal bargaining power or overreaching. '6 In short,
there was a voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known
right.
It is significant that the Court in Overmyer did not hold cognovit
notes constitutionally invalid per se but rather held that the validity
of such notes in each case turns on the effectiveness of the debtor's
waiver of his due process rights. It has been suggested, however, that
cognovit notes may be invalid per se in the case of consumer debt-
ors, as opposed to the commercial debtor in Overmyer. The theory
is that there is always a disparity of bargaining power in a consumer
setting, and the debtor receives nothing for his waiver other than the
loan itself.' 5
On the other hand, the Uniform Commercial Code, now the law
in forty-nine states,'" provides that unless otherwise agreed a se-
161. 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
162. Cognovit notes are invalid in Florida. FLA. STAT. § 55.05 (1977).
163. 405 U.S. at 187.
164. Id. at 186.
165. See Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972). The lower court held cognovit notes
invalid per se as to all persons with incomes of less than $10,000 but refused to do so as to
persons with higher incomes. The plaintiff appealed the latter result only, but the Supreme
Court affirmed. Note, however, that in this posture the Court did not address itself to the
first issue at all and thus has not held cognovit notes invalid per se as to any class of debtors.
Recently, the California Supreme Court ruled that California's confession of judgment
statutes violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment because they provide
insufficient safeguards to assure that the debtor in fact executed a voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent waiver. Further, the debtor's opportunity to seek postjudgment relief did not cure
the unconstitutionality of a judgment entered without a valid waiver. Isbell v. County of
Sonoma, 577 P.2d 188 (Cal. 1978).
166. THE AMERCAN LAW INSTITUTE & NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
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cured creditor may, upon default, repossess the collateral without
judicial process if it can be done without breach of the peace."' If
such "self-help" repossession cannot be accomplished peaceably,
the creditor must resort to legal process. If legal action is necessary,
the debtor, of course, is entitled to due process of law. But since the
creditor cannot resort to "self-help" if the security agreement pro-
vides otherwise, the execution of an agreement which does not pro-
vide otherwise is, in effect, a waiver of due process. Nevertheless,
the validity of consumer security agreements which do not exclude
"self-help" by the creditor has never been seriously questioned on
the constitutional issue of waiver-despite the fact that they are
classic examples of adhesion contracts. The validity of such agree-
ments supports the view that not all consumer waivers are per se
unconstitutional.
If a debtor may waive his constitutional right to a trial on the
merits, then theoretically he may waive his right to a preliminary
hearing to contest a prejudgment seizure pending trial. To be effec-
tive, it must be shown that the waiver is intentional, voluntary, and
informed. Since these facts cannot be demonstrated merely by prov-
ing the execution of the contract itself, some proof outside the four
corners of the agreement must be introduced to establish the valid-
ity of the waiver.
The question is: just when and how should this showing be made
in the context of provisional creditor remedies? There are several
possibilities. The writ might be issued simply on the basis of the
waiver document itself, leaving all proof of the extrinsic factors to
a later time if and when the debtor challenges the validity of the
waiver, such as by motion to dissolve the writ or by an action for
damages. A second possibility would be to issue the writ upon an
ex parte showing, by factual affidavit, of the necessary extrinsic
factors. Finally, a full adversary hearing on the waiver could be held
before the writ is issued.' The second alternative would appear to
be the most appropriate choice in light of Mitchell, but there is little
authority on the question.
IV. THE PREJUDGMENT PROCESS IN FLORIDA
The Florida provisional remedies of replevin, attachment, and
prejudgment garnishment have all been challenged successfully on
STATE LAWS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE xxxv (1972) (Table 1).
167. U.C.C. § 9-503; FLA. STAT. § 679.503 (1977). Such "self-help" repossession does not
constitute state action requiring due process safeguards. Cf. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 98 S.
Ct. 1729 (1978) (private sale by warehouseman pursuant to U.C.C. § 7-210).
168. See Clark & Landers, supra note 38, at 376.
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due process grounds. The constitutional defects of each statute will
be examined, and appropriate curative legislation will be proposed.
A. Replevin (Chapter 78 of the Florida Statutes)
The original Florida replevin statute'" fell to Mrs. Fuentes' chal-
lenge in the United States Supreme Court because it failed to pro-
vide for notice and a hearing before her property was seized, as
previously discussed.17 0 Even though the Court subsequently modi-
fied the constitutional standard in Mitchell, the majority chose to
distinguish Fuentes (rather than overrule it) because under the
Florida replevin statute the writ was issued ex parte by the court
clerk on the basis of the creditor's conclusory assertion' that the
property was being "wrongfully detained" by the debtor.' Further-
more, the only way the debtor could obtain the release of the prop-
erty pending trial was to file a forthcoming bond, there being no
opportunity for an early judicial review of the seizure before the
"eventual" trial on the merits.'73 Thus, the replevin statute invali-
dated in Fuentes would also have failed to pass constitutional mus-
ter under the Mitchell test.
The Florida Legislature responded to the problem by amending
chapter 78 of the Florida Statutes in 1973.1'1 This amendment was
a thoughtful attempt to satisfy the preseizure hearing requirement
of Fuentes while at the same time utilizing the extraordinary cir-
cumstances exception allowed in that case to enable a creditor to
obtain summary seizure of property upon a showing of unusual
need. The usual procedure established by this amendment-which
remains in effect-is to have the court order the debtor to show
cause why the property should not be taken from him and delivered
to the creditor.73 No bond is required of the creditor. Hearing on the
order is held five to ten days after service of the order on the debtor
76
unless waived by the debtor. 7 7 If, upon hearing, the court deter-
mines that there is a reasonable probability that the creditor will
169. Act of Mar. 11, 1845, ch. 43, §§ 1-14, 1845 Fla. Laws 112 (current version at FLA. STAT.
ch. 78 (1977)).
170. See notes 49-62 and accompanying text supra.
171. 416 U.S. at 615.
172. Id. at 617. In the Court's opinion, wrongful detention involves a "fault" standard
more appropriately resolved after an adversary hearing. Id.
173. Id. at 615, 618.
174. Act of May8, 1973, ch. 73-20, §§ 1-3, 1973 Fla. Laws 53 (current version atFLA. STAT.
ch. 78 (1977)).
175. FLA. STAT. § 78.065(2) (1977).
176. Id. § 78.065(2)(a).
177. Id. § 78.075.
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prevail on the merits of the underlying claim, the clerk will be
ordered to issue a writ of replevin "' directing the sheriff to seize the
property. 7 ' After three days, the sheriff delivers the property to the
creditor unless the defendant has reclaimed possession by posting
adequate security.80
The 1973 amendment also established some novel procedures af-
fording creditors additional protection when haste was essential.
These innovations-involving a temporary restraining order and
emergency writ-bear mentioning even through they have since
been repealed. Upon request and an ex parte showing by affidavit
reasonably tending to establish that the property was in danger of
destruction, concealment, removal from the jurisdiction, or transfer,
the court was authorized, in its discretion, to issue a temporary
restraining order prohibiting such acts pending the preliminary
show cause hearing.,'' As a further and final safeguard against loss
of the property, the court was empowered, in its discretion and upon
a showing by the creditor that the defendant "probably" would
violate the temporary restraining order, to order summary seizure
of the property under an emergency writ of replevin." 2
The constitutionality of this procedure was never litigated, per-
haps because the temporary restraining order and emergency writ
provisions were seldom used. The lack of creditor interest in the
temporary restraining order provision is rather curious since the
requisite grounds for obtaining it were quite similar to the tradi-
tional grounds for obtaining a writ of attachment' 3 and thus were
not unfamiliar to either creditors or the bar. Moreover, it seems
likely that most debtors would be hesitant to disobey a restraining
order-a contempt of court-and thus it would appear to have been
reasonably successful in protecting creditors' security interests. Fur-
thermore, the cost of obtaining a restraining order would not have
been appreciably greater than the cost of obtaining an order to show
cause, since both orders could be obtained at the same ex parte
judicial appearance. Thus, the only additional cost of obtaining a
restraining order would have been the time spent drafting the re-
quest and supporting affidavits.
It is not surprising, on the other hand, that few emergency writs
were sought. It is hard to imagine the unusual circumstances neces-
178. Id. § 78.067(2).
179. Id. § 78.08.
180. Id. § 78.13.
181. Act of May 8, 1973, ch. 73-20, § 1, 1973 Fla. Laws 53 (repealed 1976).
182. Id.
183. Cf. FiA. STAT. § 76.04 (1977) (debtor likely to remove or destroy the property).
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sary to support a finding that the debtor would "probably" violate
a restraining order. Seemingly, only a past history of such contempt
would suffice. Thus, as a practical matter, the emergency writ pro-
vision was of little value to creditors.
Whatever the merits of the temporary restraining order and emer-
gency writ provisions of the 1973 amendment, they were scrapped
by the Florida Legislature in 1976 in favor of an ex parte procedure
closely resembling the Louisiana sequestration procedure approved
by the Supreme Court in Mitchell. The heart of chapter 76-19, Laws
of Florida, was the adoption of a new section 78.068 of the Florida
Statutes."' This section provides that a prejudgment writ of re-
plevin may be issued ex parte by a judge" upon the plaintiff's sworn
allegations as to the nature and amount of the underlying claim and
the specific statutory grounds for a prejudgment writ.' The plain-
tiff must also post a bond in an amount twice the value of the
property or twice the balance due, if less, conditioned to pay any
damages suffered by the defendant if the writ is issued wrongfully,"
including attorney's fees.'" The judge may order the clerk to issue
184. Act of May 19, 1976, ch. 76-19, § 1, 1976 Fla. Laws 28 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 78.068
(1977)), which provides:
(1) A prejudgment writ of replevin may be issued and the property seized deliv-
ered forthwith to the petitioners when the nature of the claim and the amount
thereof, if any, and the grounds relied upon for the issuance of the writ clearly
appear from specific facts shown by the verified petition or by separate affidavit of
the petitioner.
(2) This prejudgment writ of replevin may issue if the court finds, pursuant to
subsection (1), that the defendant is engaging in, or is about to engage in, conduct
that may place the claimed property in danger of destruction, concealment, waste,
removal from the state, removal from the jurisdiction of the court, or transfer to
an innocent purchaser, during the pendency of the action, or that the defendant
has failed to make payment as agreed.
(3) The petitioner must post bond in the amount of twice the value of the goods
subject to the writ or twice the balance remaining due and owing, whichever is
lesser, as determined by the court, as security for the payment of damages the
defendant may sustain when the writ is obtained wrongfully.
(4) The defendant may obtain.release of the property seized under a prejudg-
ment writ of replevin by posting bond, within 5 days after serving of the writ, in
the amount of one and one-fourth the amount due and owing on the agreement,
for the satisfaction of any judgment, which may be rendered against him.
(5) A prejudgment writ of replevin shall issue only upon the signed order of a
circuit court judge or a county court judge.
(6) The defendant, by contradictory motion filed with the court within 10 days
after service of the writ, may obtain the dissolution of a prejudgment writ of re-
plevin, unless the petitioner proves the grounds upon which the writ was issued.
The court shall set down such motion for an immediate hearing. This motion shall
be in lieu of the provision of subsection (4).
185. FLA. STAT. § 78.068(5) (1977).
186. Id. § 78.068(1).
187. Id. § 78.068(3).
188. Id. § 78.20.
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a prejudgment writ of replevin if he finds that it "clearly
appear[s]" from the "specific facts" alleged by the plaintiff",' that
the defendant is engaging in, or is about to engage in, conduct that
may place the property "in danger of" destruction, waste, conceal-
ment, removal from the state or jurisdiction of the court,"90 or to
transfer to an innocent purchaser, or if he finds that "the defendant
has failed to make a payment as agreed.""'
After seizure of the property by the sheriff under a prejudgment
writ of replevin, the defendant may obtain the release of the prop-
erty by posting a satisfaction bond"2 or, in the alternative, by mov-
ing to dissolve the writ."13 The motion for dissolution must be given
an "immediate" hearing by the court, at which time the plaintiff
has the burden of proving the existence of the "grounds" upon
189. Id. § 78.068(1).
190. Id. § 78.068(2). It is not clear what removal from the "jurisdiction" of the court
means in this context. A writ of replevin may be ordered by a judge of either the circuit court
or the county court, Id. § 78.068(5), depending upon the value of the property. See id. §§
26.012(2)(a) (circuit court has jurisdiction in all actions not cognizable by the county courts),
34.01(1) (county court has jurisdiction when the matter in controversy does not exceed
$2,500). Both the circuit court and the county court have statewide "jurisdiction" with
respect to service of process, id. § 48.011, and enforcement of judgments, id. § 56.031, al-
though a replevin action is properly venued in the county where the property is located, id. §
78.03. The purpose of § 78.068(2) would seem best served by construing "jurisdiction" to
mean the territorial limits of the judicial circuit since that is the basic judicial entity in
Florida. Cf. id. § 76.04(12) (attachment if debtor is about to remove himself beyond the limits
of judicial circuit in which he resides) (emphasis added).
191. Id. § 78.068(2).
192. Id. § 78.068(4). This is inconsistent with § 78.13, which provides that the defendant
may recover the property by posting a forthcoming bond in an amount equal to the value of
the replevied property as appraised by the sheriff. There would seem to be no explanation
for the discrepancy except that the Louisiana statute upon which § 78.068 is modeled requires
a payment bond of one and one-fourth the amount of the plaintiff's claim. It is unclear
whether a defendant whose property has been replevied pursuant to a writ issued under §
78.068 can obtain its release by posting bond in the amount provided in § 78.13 or vice versa.
193. Id. § 78.068(6). The statute requires the defendant to file his motion to dissolve
"within 10 days after service of the writ." This is a curious requirement since there is no
express requirement that a copy of the writ itself ever be served on the defendant. Rather,
the writ is executed by seizure of the property. This may or may not afford notice in fact to
the defendant, depending on the circumstances. The defendant must, of course, be served
with a copy of the summons and complaint in the underlying action-although this may be
by publication or posting if the defendant is not amenable to personal service. Thus, by the
time the defendant actually learns of the replevy, the time may have passed for him to bring
a motion to dissolve. Since the five days in which the defendant may rebond the property
also tolls from "service" of the writ, he may not be able to recover the property until after
the trial on the merits of the plaintiff's underlying claim. This is unfortunate, especially since
no legitimate interest is served by requiring the defendant to act so quickly. The problem
might be alleviated by inferring obliquely from § 78.068(6) a requirement that the defendant
be served with a copy of the writ, although this was probably not intended by the legislature.
The problem is avoided under § 78.065(2)(c), which requires that the show cause order be
served on the defendant in the manner prescribed by the court.
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which the writ was issued. "' If the plaintiff fails to do so, the writ
is dissolved and the property is returned to the defendant pending
full trial on the merits of the plaintiff's underlying claim. If the
defendant ultimately prevails on the merits, he is entitled to judg-
ment against the plaintiff and the bonding company for his dam-
ages, if any, for the taking of the property, including his attorney's
fees.1
9 5
In 1978, in Gazil, Inc. v. Super Food Services, Inc.196 the Florida
Supreme Court held that section 78.068 satisfies the principles of
federal due process laid down in Mitchell as well as those imposed
by the Florida Constitution."17 Specifically, the court noted that (1)
section 78.068 requires the plaintiff to show by verified motion
"facts indicating a right to the property" sought to be replevied; (2)
the plaintiffs ex parte application must be presented to a judge, as
opposed to a ministerial court official; (3) the facts alleged must
show the "necessity" for replevin, which is sufficiently shown if the
debtor is in possession of the property and the plaintiff establishes
that there is a "possibility" of waste, concealment, or transfer of the
property, or that the debtor is in default on his payments;9 8 (4) the
plaintiff must post a bond to protect the debtor from "mistaken"
repossession; 91 and (5) the debtor is entitled on request to an imme-
194. Id. § 78.068(6).
195. Id. § 78.20.
196. 356 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 1978).
197. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
198. 356 So. 2d at 313. The court decided the state due process question without discus-
sion. The defendant argued that a mere default in payments is an impermissible ground for
replevin, but the court summarily dismissed this contention with the observation that the
Mitchell rationale does not limit a state's right to identify the circumstances in which pre-
judgment seizure is appropriate. Id. The point is an interesting one and perhaps merits more
attention than the short shrift accorded it. Although never clearly articulated by the United
States Supreme Court as a condition precedent to its application, the Mitchell balancing test
was predicated on a real risk of loss to the creditor if the debtor were forewarned of the
impending seizure. Indeed, the Court noted as an "important factor" that under Louisiana
law the seller's lien being foreclosed by sequestration would expire if the buyer transferred
possession of the goods. See 416 U.S. at 609. Thus, the Court implicitly found this danger
sufficient to invoke the Mitchell balancing test. Under the Uniform Commercial Code, how-
ever, security interests perfected by filing are usually binding on purchasers even if they have
no actual knowledge of the lien. See U.C.C. § 9-301(2)(c); FA. STAT. § 679.301(2)(c) (1977).
A buyer in the ordinary course of business, such as a purchaser at retail, takes free of a
security interest in the goods purchased, however, even if he has actual knowledge of the lien.
U.C.C. § 9-307(1); FLA. STAT. § 679.307(1) (1977). (This exception is to preserve the free flow
of goods at retail.) On the other hand, there is always the latent danger that a debtor in
possession of the collateral for a secured debt will damage or conceal the goods if given
advance notice of the creditor's intention to repossess. Thus, while not rising to the level of
danger present in other grounds for replevin enumerated in § 78.068(2) of the Florida Stat-
utes, mere delinquency in payment by a debtor in possession of the collateral may be ade-
quate constitutionally to outweigh the need for a prior hearing.
199. 356 So. 2d at 313. The actual condition of the statutory bond is the payment of
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diate postseizure hearing on the issue of possession.2® Finding that
section 78.068 complies with the Mitchell standards, the court held
it constitutional.
There is at least one other constitutional objection to section
78.068 which the Florida Supreme Court did not address in Gazil.
This involves the showing which the plaintiff must make at the
hearing on a motion to dissolve the writ. Under section 78.068(6) the
plaintiff is required only to prove the existence of the "grounds"
upon which the writ was issued, that is, evidence of the defendant's
conduct which is allegedly impairing the safety or value of the prop-
erty to be replevied. This provision of the statute was taken almost
verbatim from the Louisiana statute upheld by the Supreme Court
in Mitchell. However, the Court announced a somewhat different
"constitutional standard" in Carey, requiring the plaintiff to dem-
onstrate at the postseizure hearing the likelihood that he would
ultimately prevail on the merits.21 Section 78.068(6) might be con-
strued to require such a showing. 20
Two rationales are possible, but neither seems convincing. First,
the requirement that the plaintiff's application for the writ show the
nature and amount of his claim, as well as the grounds for summary
seizure, might be read to require a consideration of the merits of the
underlying claim.2 3 However, this would clearly require the addi-
tion by a sympathetic court of a gloss not fairly contemplated by
the language of section 78.068(1), which refers to the "grounds" for
the writ in the conjunctive with the nature and amount of the plain-
tiff's claim, not as inclusive of the underlying claim. Secondly, it
might be argued that section 78.068(6) must be read in pari materia
with section 78.067(2), which requires the court to consider "the
probable validity of the underlying claim" at the hearing on the
order to show cause why the property should not be seized and
delivered to the plaintiff. Although this is precisely the question
damages sutained by the debtor if the writ is obtained "wrongfully." FLA. STAT. § 78.068(3)
(1977). There are no cases construing the meaning of "wrongful" replevin, and it may not be
synonomous with "mistaken." See notes 254-69 and accompanying text infra regarding dam-
ages for "improper" attachment under the analogous statutory bond.
200. 356 So. 2d at 313; see FLA. STAT. § 78.068(5) (1977). In Gazil, the Florida court
"receded" from its previous decisions to the extent that they had suggested that a postseizure
hearing was "required" under Mitchell and declared unequivocally that due process is satis-
fied by the "opportunity" for a prompt hearing at the request of the defendant after seizure.
356 So. 2d at 313; see Ray Lein Constr., Inc. v. Wainwright, 346 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 1977)
(garnishment), discussed at notes 312-18 infra; Phillips v. Guin & Hunt, Inc., 344 So. 2d 568
(Fla. 1977) (distress for rent); Unique Caterers, Inc. v. Rudy's Farm Co., 338 So. 2d 1067 (Fla.
1976) (attachment), discussed at notes 209-18 infra.
201. 425 U.S. at 78.
202. It was this possibility which led the Court to remand Carey. 425 U.S. at 78-79.
203. See FLA. STAT. § 78.068(1), (6) (1977), quoted in note 184 supra.
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mandated by Carey, section 78.068 stands as a separate procedure,
independent of the show cause procedure. ' There is thus no reason
to read section 78.067(2) in pari materia with section 78.068(6).
Apart from this possible constitutional infirmity, easily remedied,
it would seem desirable from both a substantive and a stylistic point
of view to model reform of the other Florida provisional remedies
after section 78.068. As a matter of policy, rather than constitutional
compulsion, it could be argued that a Fuentes-type preliminary
hearing should be held before every prejudgment seizure, absent an
extraordinarily compelling need for haste. However, the Florida
Legislature seems consciously to have rejected such a policy in 1976
when it amended chapter 78 to provide for summary seizure, judi-
cially supervised as in Mitchell.
Given the fundamental state policy favoring sharper creditor de-
vices at the expense of greater debtor protection, there would seem
to be little reason to deviate substantively from the balance drawn
in section 78.068 in revising the attachment and prejudgment gar-
nishment statutes. Moreover, both the bench and bar undoubtedly
would appreciate a consistent prejudgment procedure regardless of
the specific writ involved, and uniformity of language would aid in
construction through the development of a body of broadly applica-
ble judicial precedent. However, before accepting blindly the proce-
204. As originally enacted in chapter 73-20, a show cause order was used in conjunction
with a temporary restraining order or emergency writ of replevin. Functionally, the ex parte
procedure of § 78.068 is the substitute for the restraining order and emergency writ provisions
which were repealed upon the adoption of § 78.068, thus suggesting that the show cause
procedure must be used in conjunction with the summary procedures of § 78.068. However,
§ 78.068 itself makes no reference to a show cause order, and several of the specific require-
ments of § 78.068 are inconsistent with counterpart requirements of chapter 78 applicable to
the show cause procedure. For example, § 78.068(3) requires the plaintiff to post a bond while
the show cause procedure does not. Furthermore, under § 78.068(4) the defendant may obtain
release of the property seized by posting within five days a satisfaction bond in the amount
of one and one-fourth the amount due, while under § 78.13 the sheriff must deliver the
replevied property to the plaintiff unless within three days the defendant posts a forthcoming
bond in an amount equal to the value of the property. A more fundamental inconsistency
concerns the paradox of according the defendant under § 78.068(6) a right to move within 10
days for the dissolution of the writ if there is in all cases to be a show cause hearing within
10 days on the plaintiff's right to the writ. See FLA. STAT. § 78.065(2)(a) (1977). This would
result in two hearings and strongly suggests that § 78.068 is a separate and independent
procedure for obtaining a prejudgment writ of replevin. See 1 S. RAKusnN, supra note 31, at §
3.05A, at 56a.
Section 78.068 does not, however, render the show cause procedures of chapter 78 nugatory.
Since the requisite grounds for an ex parte writ may not exist or the plaintiff may simply
decide there is little danger in giving the defendant prior notice of the replevy, the plaintiff
may choose to use the show cause procedure rather than the summary procedure of § 78.068.
There are at least two affirmative reasons why a plaintiff may prefer the show cause proce-
dure: first, it reduces the risk of a wrongful seizure for which he might be liable, and second,
it is less expensive since it does not require posting a bond.
1272 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:1233
dures and language of section 78.068 as a model for further statutory
reform, it is necessary to examine them critically for clarity and
precision. In this light, section 78.068 does not fare too well.
Section 78.068(1) requires the statutory grounds for the issuance
of the writ to be shown by specific facts alleged in either a verified
petition or a separate affidavit. Although this seems to meet the
Mitchell test, it raises several problems of statutory construction.
First, as a matter of style, the Florida Statutes usually use the term
"petition" to refer to the initial pleading for the commencement of
an independent action and the term "motion" to refer to a pleading
for the commencement of a proceeding ancillary to the main action.
For example, both the writs of attachment and garnishment are
obtained by "motion," and this term should also be used in section
78.068(1).
As written, the section also provides that the factual basis for the
writ be shown by petition "or by separate affidavit of the
petitioner. " There would seem to be no objection to a third person's
attesting to the existence of the statutory grounds, and in fact such
testimony might be preferable in an ex parte proceeding. For in-
stance, section 76.10 provides, when the debt is not yet due, that
the existence of the grounds for attachment must be shown by an
affidavit other than the plaintiff's. Permitting third-party testi-
mony would also allow for a showing of the statutory grounds by
personal knowledge rather than on mere information and belief of
the plaintiff, since in many cases the plaintiff will not have personal
knowledge of the conduct by which the defendant is endangering the
property. This, of course, assumes that the plaintiff can meet his
constitutional burden by allegations of fact not within his own per-
sonal knowledge.
The Supreme Court has never spoken on this issue, but it would
not seem unreasonable to allow the judge to consider hearsay affida-
vit testimony in an ex parte proceeding since the plaintiff will be
put to his proof soon in an adversary hearing at which the witnesses
will be subject to cross-examination. 05 On the other hand, the con-
stitutional purpose of this requirement is to minimize the risk of
error, and restricting affidavit testimony to the affiant's personal
knowledge might reduce the possibility of error. The judge, of
205. According to Justice Powell, the "basic protection" is the assurance of a prompt
postgarnishment hearing for the rectification of any error in the initial decision to issue the
writ. North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. at 611 n.3 (Powell, J., concurring);
accord, VT. R. Civ. P. 4.1(i), as amended March 12, 1975: "Affidavits required by this rule
[attachment] shall set forth specific facts sufficient to warrant the required findings and
shall be upon the affiant's own knowledge, information, or belief; and, so far as upon informa-
tion and belief, shall state that he believes this information to be true."
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course, is not required to accept the truth of every allegation and
can consider the source of any indirect testimony in making his
findings. Moreover, the plaintiff's exposure to liability for wrongful
seizure serves as a check upon irresponsible allegations not within
the plaintiff's personal knowledge. Given the open nature of the
issue, the legislature should weigh the competing interests and re-
solve the question explicitly as a matter of statutory policy.
Section 78.068(2) provides that the judge "may" order the issu-
ance of a prejudgment writ of replevin if he "finds, pursuant to
subsection (1)," that there are adequate grounds for the writ. The
reference to subsection (1) probably incorporates the requirement
that the grounds "clearly appear" from the specific facts alleged,
thereby creating a higher standard of proof than a mere prima facie
showing. It implies that the judge, as the ex parte reviewer of the
facts, should not accept every statement at face value. Instead, he
perhaps should be somewhat skeptical, even in the absence of any
contradictory evidence (which will almost always be the case).
The Supreme Court has never discussed the standard of proof
constitutionally required at this stage of the proceedings, except for
Justice Powell's footnote reference in Di- Chem that the initial show-
ing need not be "elaborate." 2 As a matter of policy, however, the
somewhat more stringent standard suggested by section 78.068(1)
seems entirely appropriate in light of its intended purpose of pre-
venting mistaken seizures. But this standard should be more clearly
articulated as a measure of proof and moved to section 78.068(2),
which establishes the findings requisite for the issuance of a writ.
One other aspect of section 78.068(2) merits consideration. The
section provides that a prejudgment writ of replevin "may" issue
upon proper findings. It is not clear whether issuance of the writ is
mandatory in such circumstances or whether it is discretionary with
the court. "May" usually connotes a permissive action, as con-
trasted with the mandatory "shall." 27 It would be desirable, as a
matter of policy, to give the judge some discretion in issuing this
extraordinary writ-even where the statutory grounds are found to
exist. This would be consistent with the traditional equitable nature
of the provisional remedies generally.m Again, comparison with the
former temporary restraining order and emergency writ provisions
of chapter 73-20 is instructive. In both cases, the statute expressly
206. 419 U.S. at 612 n.5.
207. Such as the requirement in subsection (6) that the court "shall" hear immediately a
motion to dissolve the writ.
208. See, e.g., OKUA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1152 (West Supp. 1976), noted in TeSelle &
Love, supra note 86, at 268 n.73.
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provided that, upon the requisite findings, "the court, in its discre-
tion, may issue" the relief requested.2 " Any remedial legislation
should be equally clear if equitable discretion is intended.
Under section 78.068, the debtor has two alternative means of
regaining possession of the property seized. He may either post a
satisfaction bond under subsection (4) or file a contradictory motion
under subsection (6) to dissolve the writ. Since he has an absolute
right to seek dissolution without posting a bond, the basic scheme
of these sections is constitutionally sound. As a model for similar
legislation, however, these subsections pose several problems.
Subsection (4) requires the defendant to post the bond within five
days after service of the writ while subsection (6) requires him to
file the contradictory motion 10 to dissolve the writ within ten days
after service.
First, as a matter of style, the Florida Statutes do not normally
use the term "contradictory motion," which the legislature bor-
rowed verbatim from the Louisiana statute used as a model by the
draftsman of section 78.068. Furthermore, as a technical matter,
tolling the time periods from the service of the writ is somewhat
perplexing, for there is no express requirement in section 78.068 that
the writ of replevin be "served" on the defendant .2t Rather, the
sheriff executes the writ by levy on the property, either actually or
constructively.2 12 It would, of course, be possible (and desirable) to
add a provision requiring personal service of the writ on the defen-
dant in addition to levying on the property.
The most serious problem with these subsections, however, is the
basic notion of compelling the defendant to choose his course of
action within five or ten days or, by implication, waive his right to
seek repossession of the property pending the final outcome of the
trial on the merits. In many cases, the defendant might not even be
aware of the seizure until after the time for action has elapsed. This
objection might be overcome by requiring personal service of the
writ on the defendant and tolling the time periods from such ser-
vice.2 13
209. See Act of May 8, 1973, ch. 73-20, § 1, 1973 Fla. Laws 53 (repealed 1976).
210. Cf. FLA. STAT. §§ 76.04, 77.07 (1977) (neither use the term "contradictory").
211. The defendant must, of course, be served with a copy of the summons and complaint
in the underlying action, as in any other lawsuit. Service of the complaint may not, however,
always be accomplished within the five- or ten-day period in which the defendant must post
bond or move to dissolve the writ.
212. Constructive levy is accomplished by openly exercising dominion and control over
the property in a manner hostile to the defendant's ownership interest, for example, by
padlocking, rendering equipment inoperative, or posting conspicuous notice of levy. See, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. § 76.16(2) (1977).
213. The court might construe § 78.068(4), (6) to require service of the writ on the defen-
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A better solution would be to allow the defendant to post bond or
file for dissolution of the writ at any time after seizure. This is
consistent with the analogous provisions of present Florida law re-
garding attachment 14 and garnishment 15 There is no apparent rea-
son to put the defendant to his election in such a short period of
time. In many cases, the short time allowed will put the defendant
under some duress. Virtually always, he must consult an attorney
even to become aware of his options, and, if he seeks to post bond,
he may have to raise liquid collateral equal to the amount of the
bond as security for the bonding company.
21
Moreover, there is no apparent reason to coerce the defendant
into hasty action from the plaintiff's point of view. Since section
78.068(1) provides that the property seized may be delivered
"forthwith" to the plaintiff, arguably the requirement that the de-
fendant timely elect his course of action might be intended to facili-
tate release of the property by the sheriff to the plaintiff. Section
78.068 does not, however, elaborate on the meaning of "forthwith,"
and section 78.13 establishes as a general rule that the property
shall be delivered to the plaintiff after three days unless the defen-
dant has posted a bond within that time.2 17 Thus, the sheriff may
already have delivered the property to the plaintiff before the end
of the time given the defendant to act, and, on posting bond or on
dissolution of the writ, the property would have to be recovered from
the plaintiff.
While no legitimate interest of the plaintiff appears to be served
by the short time accorded the defendant to decide what action to
take, there is a strong coercive effect on the defendant which greatly
increases the plaintiff's leverage in negotiating a hasty settlement.
The plaintiff knows that if settlement cannot be reached within five
days, the defendant has waived his right to rebond the property,
and, if there is no settlement within ten days, the defendant has
waived any possibility of regaining possession of the property until
after the trial. This is true even if the seizure is wrongful. The
plaintiff knows the defendant must decide quickly whether to spend
dant for the sole purpose of tolling the time periods. If so, the time within which the defendant
could move to dissolve the writ or rebond the property would never be tolled unless the writ
were served on the defendant.
214. FLA. STAT. §§ 76.19 (rebond), .24 (motion to dissolve) (1977).
215. Id. §§ 77.07 (motion to dissolve), .24 (rebond).
216. See Alexander, Wrongful Attachment Damages Must Be Fixed in the Original Suit,
4 U.S.F.L. REv. 38, 40 (1969).
217. It is not clear whether § 78.13 applies to property replevied under § 78.068, especially
if the latter section is deemed an independent procedure. See discussion at notes 192-95
supra.
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the additional money to post bond or retain counsel to contest the
seizure. The plaintiff is in a position to wait and the defendant is
not, thus creating an unequal bargaining situation. On balance, the
coercive time limits for the defendant's action should be eliminated,
and the defendant should be allowed to rebond the property or move
to dissolve the writ at any time after seizure.
Thus, while section 78.068, with slight modification, provides a
minimally constitutional model for revision of the other Florida
provisional writ procedures, it has a number of shortcomings which
ought not be perpetuated in the name of uniformity. On the other
hand, where the procedures or terminology of section 78.068 are
sound, technically and stylistically, as well as constitutionally, they
should be carried over to enhance procedural familiarity and to
provide greater opportunity for judicial interpretation.
B. Attachment (Chapter 76 of the Florida Statutes)'"8
1. Constitutionality
In Unique Caterers, Inc. v. Rudy's Farm Co. 211 the Florida Su-
preme court held chapter 76 of the Florida Statutes unconstitu-
tional insofar as it permits prejudgment seizure of personal property
without either notice and a prior hearing or the saving characteris-
tics of Mitchell.220 Specifically, the court found chapter 76 constitu-
tionally deficient in three respects:22' (1) it does not require that a
218. After this article was completed and substantially through the editorial process prior
to publication, the Florida Legislature amended chapter 76 to address some of the matters
discussed in this section. Act of May 12, 1978, ch. 78-38, 1978 Fla. Laws 50. First, § 2 of ch.
78-38 requires that "the grounds relied on for issuance of the writ clearly appear from specific
facts shown by a verified complaint" as recommended in section IVB.2.a infra. The balance
of the author's analysis remains to be addressed, however, by the legislature.
Second, § 1 of ch. 78-38 requires a judge to issue the attachment writ as recommended in
section IVB.2.b infra. Again, the author raises other considerations which should be studied
by the legislature.
Third, § 4 of ch. 78-38 requires the court to set the defendant's motion to dissolve "for an
immediate hearing." This is an improvement over the previous provision of § 76.24(1) of the
Florida Statutes, see text accompanying note 274 infra, but further considerations, as dis-
cussed in section IVB.2.d infra, still need to be addressed.
And finally, § 3 of ch. 78-38 amends § 76.18 to reduce the amount of the forthcoming bond
from double the value of the property levied to one and one-fourth the value of the property
levied or the amount of the claim, whichever is less. This again is an improvement, but the
author recommends that the amount of the bond ultimately be left to the judge's discretion,
in light of possible damages. For convenience, the author would allow the plaintiff initially
to use the value of the property, subject to the judge's further order. See discussion in section
TVB.2.e infra.
219. 338 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 1976).
220. Id. at 1071.
221. Id.
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judge issue the writ;'" (2) it does not require that an affidavit sup-
port the alleged grounds for the writ;2ss and, (3) "most seriously," it
does not require that the defendant's postseizure motion to dissolve
the writ be heard immediately.2 24 In other respects, the court found
that the statute does satisfy the Mitchell standards.21 5 It requires the
plaintiff to post a bond before the writ issues.221 It permits the defen-
dant to recover the property by posting a bond.2  And it places the
burden of proof on the plaintiff to prove the existence of the grounds
upon which the writ issued.
2
78
Although the court in Unique Caterers did not limit its opinion
on the constitutionality of chapter 76 to the attachment of personal
property, such a distinction is plausible. The basis for this distinc-
tion is the difference in the nature of the "taking" in the attachment
of real property and the attachment of personal property. Real prop-
erty is attached by recording a notice of levy in the official records
of the county in which the property is located.2 1 The attachment
results in the creation of an inchoate judicial lien on the property.
23
0
222. FLA. STAT. § 76.03 (1977).
223. Id. § 76.09.
224. Id. § 76.24(1). It has been suggested that the Florida Supreme Court went beyond
the Mitchell requirements in Unique, holding that the postseizure hearing was mandatory
even if the defendant did not move to dissolve the writ. See 1 S. RAKUSiN, supra note 31, at §
1.02D. This reading of the opinion stemmed from the court's statement that the statute was
deficient because it "does not require an immediate post-seizure hearing." 338 So. 2d at 1071
(emphasis in original). To the extent Unique intimated that due process "required" a postsei-
zure hearing, it was overruled in Gazil, Inc. v. Super Food Servs., Inc., 356 So. 2d 312 (Fla.
1978), discussed at note 200 supra, which declared that due process merely requires an
opportunity for a postseizure hearing at the request of the defendant. 356 So. 2d at 313. This
is entirely consistent with Mitchell, in which Justice White noted that the Louisiana statute
"entitles the debtor immediately to seek dissolution of the writ" by filing a contradictory
motion. 416 U.S. at 606 (emphasis added). There is not the slightest intimation in any of the
United States Supreme Court's decisions that the hearing is mandatory, nor has any lower
court or legal commentator suggested it. See TeSelle & Love, supra note 86, at 268, 278.
Moreover, a mandatory hearing would add little meaningful protection for the defendant at
considerable cost to the plaintiff. If the defendant does not object to the attachment, he
presumably will not attend the hearing since to do so would result in additional legal fees. In
the defendant's absence, the postseizure hearing will not be an adversary proceeding but will
merely duplicate the ex parte showing already made by the plaintiff in obtaining the writ. A
mandatory hearing would, however, significantly increase the cost of attachment for plaintiffs
(creditors) as a class since in all cases a lawyer would have to be paid to appear at the hearing.
This cost would, of course, be passed on to debtors, as a class, in the form of higher interest
rates or the loss of credit altogether for marginal-risk debtors.
225. 338 So. 2d at 1071.
226. FLA. STAT. § 76.12 (1977).
227. Id. § 76.18.
228. Id. § 76.24(2); see Luciano v. Service Mach. Corp., 112 So. 2d 890, 892 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1959).
229. FLA. STAT. § 76.14 (1977); see notes 15-18 and accompanying text supra.
230. An attachment lien is contingent until "perfected" by entry of final judgment. How-
ever, the creditor's priority is established in the order of attachment, not perfection.
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This attachment lien in no way interferes with the defendant's use
or possession of the property, but it does constitute a cloud on the
defendant's title since the lien is binding on subsequent purchasers
and creditors.Y'
The real economic consequence of an attachment of real property
is that a prospective purchaser will either insist that the cloud be
removed by the seller before sale or that the purchase price be
reduced by the amount of the claim. To remove the cloud, the
defendant may post a satisfaction bond2 32 or otherwise obtain a vol-
untary satisfaction of the lien from the plaintiff, either by payment
of the claim or by substitution of security.2 3 Many prospective
purchasers, on the other hand, simply do not want to become em-
broiled in a lengthy foreclosure proceeding and will not purchase
the attached property unless a full satisfaction can be obtained
quickly and cleanly before purchase. Thus, the defendant may
suffer substantial economic consequences if he wishes to sell or
mortgage the property.
While some courts have held such consequences to be so de min-
imis as not even to constitute "property" worthy of protection under
the due process clause, 234 the better view is that the imposition of
an attachment lien is, for constitutional purposes, the "taking" of
"property" but, because of the nature of the "taking," it is one
which requires less protection than the seizure of personal property.
Conversely, no creditor interest is served by not according the same
Mitchell-type safeguards to the attachment of real property since
the attachment lien effectively precludes alienation of the property
by the debtor. Thus, with respect to any proposed amendment of
chapter 76, there is no reason, as a matter of policy, to consider
providing a separate procedure for the attachment of real property,
even though it might be constitutionally possible.
231. FLA. STAT. § 76.14 (1977); see Florida Ins. Exch. v. Adler, 174 So. 2d 75, 77 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
232, The release of attached property under a satisfaction bond extinguishes the attach-
ment lien, giving the defendant clear title. Release of attached real property under a forth-
coming bond does not extinguish the attachment lien and thus is of little benefit to the
defendant since his use and enjoyment of the property is not impaired anyway.
233. The Florida Legislature recently recognized this problem with respect to judgment
liens. Section 55.10 of the Florida Statutes was amended in 1977 to provide for the transfer
of a judgment lien from the debtor's real property to other security deposited with the court,
such as a sum of money or a satisfaction bond in an amount equal to the judgment plus six
percent interest for three years and $100 court costs. Upon such deposit, the clerk-issues a
certificate of transfer, and upon recordation the lien is released. Act of June 30, 1977, ch. 77-
462, § 1, 1977 Fla. Laws 1892 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 55.10(2)-(4) (1977)).




The threshold question to be addressed before turning to the spe-
cifics of any proposed reform of chapter 76 is the appropriate mea-
sure of protection to be accorded debtors as a matter of state policy.
For example, although it is clearly not necessary constitutionally to
give the debtor notice and an opportunity for an adversary hearing
before attaching his property, prior notice and an opportunity to be
heard are the most effective means of preventing mistake and
wrongful seizure2' if a state wishes to minimize these possibilities.
On the other hand, there are significant risks to the creditor's inter-
ests if the debtor is given prior notice of the creditor's intention to
attach the debtor's property. Since the notice itself furnishes a
warning to the debtor, there is a real danger that a debtor acting in
bad faith will damage or alienate the property before the hearing.
A state is entitled-if it wishes-to recognize this reality and to
provide somewhat more protection for the creditor .136
Traditional Florida policy, as evidenced by present chapter 76,
resolves this fundamental question in favor of the creditor. Although
the Florida Legislature did amend chapter 78 in 1973 to provide for
notice and a hearing before the seizure of property pursuant to a
prejudgment writ of replevin-a remedy analogous to attach-
ment-this amendment was adopted under the duress of Fuentes
and did not represent a free policy choice. Any doubt on this score
was resolved in 1976 when the legislature again amended chapter 78,
after Mitchell, to restore the right of summary seizure, properly
supervised. Thus, the legislature appears to have eschewed any de-
sign to change, as a matter of state policy, the fundamental balance
between the rights of debtors and creditors with respect to the provi-
sional remedies. The task then becomes one of fashioning adequate
safeguards to satisfy the Mitchell standards.
a. Affidavit
In the words of the Florida Supreme Court, Mitchell requires "a
supporting affidavit clearly setting out the grounds for issuance of
the writ."' ' 7 The affidavit must allege the specific facts constituting
the statutory grounds rather than a mere conclusory statement such
as "the debtor is about to remove his property out of the state." In
addition, the affidavit must allege specific facts supporting the
plaintiff's underlying cause of action since the judge must also de-
235. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. at 83.
236. See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. at 608.
237. Unique Caterers, Inc. v. Rudy's Farm Co., 338 So. 2d at 1070.
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termine the prima facie sufficiency of the plaintiff's claim. The new
replevin statute requires that both the nature of the claim and the




Chapter 76 should likewise require factual allegations in support
of both the underlying claim and the statutory grounds for the writ.
Contrary to the provisions of section 78.068, however, there should
be no requirement that the plaintiff be the affiant. Any person with
knowledge of the facts is competent to swear to the requisite facts.
If the plaintiff is a corporation, it becomes imperative to accept the
testimony of officers or agents. In other situations as well there
would seem to be no rational reason to limit sworn testimony to the
plaintiff himself. Indeed, the reliability of the testimony might ac-
tually be enhanced if it came from an independent source.
The affidavit requirement poses a question which does not seem
to have been litigated to date. That is: must the affiant have per-
sonal knowledge of the facts alleged or may he swear to the facts on
information and belief?=9 Hearsay is, of course, traditionally barred
from the courtroom, subject to numerous exceptions, because of the
increased likelihood of error and the inability to test such testimony
by cross-examination. In the context of a creditor's application for
a writ of attachment, only the first of these reasons is applicable.
The application is ex parte, so there is no occasion for cross-
examination. From the debtor's perspective, permitting hearsay
may increase the possibility of error. From the creditor's standpoint,
however, prohibiting hearsay may increase significantly the cost of
attachment by requiring affidavits from a number of witnesses. In
some cases such a requirement might preclude seeking the writ
altogether, as where a key witness is unavailable or refuses to coop-
erate.
238. Id. at 1071; see FLA. STAT. § 78.068 (1977).
239. Under the Florida statute, when the debt is actually due, the plaintiff's motion must
allege that he "has reason to believe in the existence of one or more of the special grounds in
§ 76.04, stating specifically the grounds." FLA. STAT. § 76.09 (1977) (emphasis added). The
Florida Supreme Court has held that the plaintiff's oath is not absolute in character, requir-
ing only a reasonable belief in the existence of the statutory grounds for attachment so that
"conscientious men would [not] hesitate before taking such an oath." Zinn v. Dzialynski,
13 Fla. 597, 601 (1871). The real issue is the reasonableness of the plaintiff's belief, based on
the defendant's actual conduct, not the truth of the plaintiff's belief. The mere fact that the
plaintiff has been credibly informed that the defendant had fraudulently parted with his
property, for example, would not justify sustaining the writ, but if it can be shown that the
defendant had in fact so acted, or that he had in fact acted in a manner to justify a reasonable
belief that he fraudulently disposed of his property, the writ should be sustained. See Reese
v. Damato, 33 So. 459, 462 (Fla. 1902); Eckman v. Munnerlyn, 13 So. 922, 924 (Fla. 1893);
Meinhard, Bros. & Co. v. Lilienthal, 17 Fla. 501, 505-06 (1880).
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On balance, it would be better to allow hearsay affidavits. An ex
parte process concedes the increased possibility of error, and the
reliability of the process would not be diminished significantly by
the hearsay nature of the affidavit. Moreover, since the writ is dis-
cretionary, the judge can always deny the application if there is
reason to doubt the authenticity of the hearsay allegations. Finally,
if the defendant disputes the truth of any allegation, he may quickly
put the plaintiff to his proof in an adversary proceeding conducted
in accordance with the rules of evidence.
b. Judicial Supervision
Although Justice White's opinions speak of the necessity of hav-
ing a judge review the plaintiff's application and authorize the issu-
ance of the writ,u' a majority of the Supreme Court justices have
expressed the view that this is not a meaningful requirement. 4'
Several lower courts have approved procedures permitting the writ
to be issued by a court clerk, at least where the clerk has the author-
ity and the expertise needed to exercise discretion in such matters
and is not acting merely pro forma.2 2 Although in Unique Caterers
the Florida Supreme Court stated flatly that chapter 76 was defi-
cient because it did not require that a judge issue the writ, 2 the
same court has spoken subsequently of "a judicial officer," suggest-
ing that clerks may so qualify.
24 '
The court has observed that if a clerk can make an initial determi-
nation of probable cause to arrest in a criminal proceeding, "it is
certainly constitutionally permissible for him to make an initial
determination regarding the issuance of a [creditor's] writ.
' 2
Thus, it may well be that on reconsideration the court would ap-
prove the issuance of writs of attachment by clerks without judicial
order. However, casting court clerks in the role of judicial officers
240. North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. at 606; Mitchell v. W.T. Grant
Co., 416 U.S. at 616. Justice Powell's analysis, on the other hand, calls for a "neutral officer"
or "magistrate." North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. at 611 n.3 (clerk OK);
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. at 625.
241. North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. at 619 (Blackmun, Rehnquist,
& Burger, JJ., dissenting); id. at 611 n.3 (Powell, J., concurring); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.,
416 U.S. at 632 (Stewart, Douglas, & Marshall, JJ., dissenting); see note 136 and accompany-
ing text supra.
242. See cases cited note 138 supra.
243. 338 So. 2d at 1071.
244. See Phillips v. Guin & Hunt, Inc., 344 So. 2d 568, 574 (Fla. 1977), in which the
Florida nonresidential distress-for-rent procedure, FLA. STAT. §§ 83.11-.19 (1977), was held
unconstitutional.
245. Phillips v. Guin & Hunt, Inc., 344 So. 2d 568, 574 n.7 (Fla. 1977) (citing Shadwick
v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972)).
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exercising independent judgment and discretion, rather than acting
pro forma in a ministerial capacity, would be almost unique in
Florida jurisprudence. Therefore, the statute should be amended to
prohibit clerks from issuing writs of attachment except upon order
of a judge.
Although not unmindful of the added burden this would place on
the state's judges, it would perhaps assure debtors of a more percep-
tive and sensitive guardian of their rights and a more desirable
balancing of the interests of debtors and creditors. Moreover, as
evidenced by the most recent amendment of the replevin statute,
the Florida Legislature has already determined the appropriateness
of entrusting to a judge, rather than a clerk, the initial decision of
whether the creditor is entitled to have the debtor's property seized
summarily.
The statute should also make clear precisely what finding is re-
quired of the judge in order to support an order of attachment.
Implicit in Mitchell's requirement that the motion must be sup-
ported by an affidavit alleging specific facts is the notion that the
judge will scrutinize the factual allegations and, upon finding them
sufficient, order the writ to be issued.
The statute should also make clear what showing is required of
the plaintiff. The Louisiana sequestration statute approved in
Mitchell called for the grounds to be "clearly apparent" from the
facts alleged. 6 Both Justices White and Powell distinguished the
Florida replevin statute struck down in Fuentes by noting that it did
not require a "convincing showing" that the plaintiff was entitled
to relief.241 This requires that the judge "properly evaluate" the facts
alleged.248 According to Justice White, approval is not a mere minis-
terial act-contrary to the view of the dissent.249 In Di-Chem, Jus-
tice Powell said the initial showing need not be "elaborate. ' '250 In
accordance with these views, the Florida statute should authorize
the judge to order the attachment writ if he finds that the facts
alleged by the plaintiff reasonably tend to establish the existence of
one or more of the statutory grounds, as well as the prima facie
validity of the plaintiff's underlying claim.25'
246. LA. CODE CiV. PRO. ANN. art. 3501 (West 1961), quoted in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant
Co., 416 U.S. at 621.
247. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. at 615, 626.
248. Id. at 616 n.12.
249. Id. at 632-33 (Stewart, Douglas, & Marshall, JJ., dissenting), referring to the "formal
sufficiency" of the affidavit.
250. 419 U.S. at 612 n.5.
251. See Act of May 8, 1973, ch. 73-20, § 1, 1973 Fla. Laws 53 (repealed 1976).
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c. Bond
The present attachment statute requires the plaintiff to post a
bond with surety payable to the defendant in an amount at least
double the amount of the plaintiff's claim, conditioned to pay all
costs and damages sustained by the defendant if the attachment is
improperly sued out.252 Although the Florida Supreme Court im-
plied in Unique Caterers153 that this provision satisfies the Mitchell
requirements, the court did not attempt a careful analysis. In fact,
neither the present Florida law nor the precise constitutional para-
meters of the bond requirement are entirely clear.
First, it is not clear under what circumstances the defendant can
recover under the bond. The statutory condition is "to pay all costs
and damages which defendant sustains in consequence of plaintiff's
improperly suing out the attachment. '" 51 Liability under the statu-
tory bond for improper attachment is distinct from the common law
tort actions of malicious prosecution and abuse of process. 255 No
showing of malice is required for an action on the bond, contrary to
the requirement under either tort theory. 25 To prove the attachment
was "improper," the defendant must show either that the plaintiff's
underlying claim was without merit or that, in fact, no grounds
existed for the attachment.257 Liability is thus not assumed merely
because the writ is dissolved or the plaintiff fails to recover a final
judgment in the main action.2 5 The writ is not "improper" if dis-
solved because of some technicality or irregularity or because the
plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the main action.259 On the other
hand, a final judgment on the merits dismissing the plaintiff's main
action has been held sufficient proof that the attachment was
"improper."
260
252. FLA. STAT. § 76.12 (1977).
253. 338 So. 2d at 1071.
254. FLA. STAT. § 76.12 (1977). Section 559.77(1) provides: "If it appears to the court that
the suit brought by the plaintiff was ill-founded or brought for purposes of harassment, the
plaintiff shall be liable for court costs and reasonable attorney's fees incurred by the defen-
dant."
255. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gulf Heating & Refrigeration Co., 184 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (tort); Florida Transp. Co. v. Dixie Sightseeing Tours, Inc., 139 So. 2d
175 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (bond).
256. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gulf Heating & Refrigeration Co., 184 So. 2d 705, 706 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
257. Steen v. Ross, Keen & Co., 22 Fla. 480, 485-86 (1886) (the leading Florida case).
258. Id.
259. See American Sur. Co. v. Florida Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 94 F.2d 126 (5th Cir. 1938);
Ritter v. Miami Marine Agency, Inc., 133 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1961). But see
Dynatronics, Inc. v. Knorr, 247 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1971) (issue not raised).
260. See Florida Transp. Co. v. Dixie Sightseeing Tours, Inc., 139 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1962); Norman Babel Mortgage Co. v. Golden Heights Land Co., 117 So. 2d 205
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In an action on the statutory bond, the defendant may recover all
costs and damages suffered as a result of the improper attachment,
including damage to the~property, 211 loss of use of the property for
the period held,262 injury to the defendant's reputation, 23 and attor-
ney's fees incurred in obtaining dissolution of the writ. 214 Punitive
damages are not recoverable under the bond but may be recovered
under either of the tort theories.265 Recovery is limited to the amount
of the bond.66 Procedurally, the rule in Florida seems to be that the
defendant cannot counterclaim for improper attachment but must
bring a separate action independent of the plaintiffs main action.
267
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 122 So. 2d 407 (Fla. 1960).
261. See, e.g., American Sur. Co. v. Florida Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 94 F.2d 216 (5th Cir.
1938) (loss of garnished funds when bond failed); Gonzales v. De Funiak Havana Tobacco
Co., 26 So. 1012 (Fla. 1899) (deterioration of attached cigars); Florida Transp. Co. v. Dixie
Sightseeing Tours, Inc., 139 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (damage to attached
buses).
262. See, e.g., Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. L. Bucki & Son Lumber Co., 189 U.S. 135, 142
(1903) (loss of profits when business property attached); Florida Transp. Co. v. Dixie
Sightseeing Tours, Inc., 139 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (rental value of attached
buses).
263. Nash v. Walker, 78 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 1955). In Martin v. Martin, 196 So. 2d 26 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 201 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 1967), the trial court awarded damages
for shame, humiliation, and personal inconvenience. The case was reversed on other grounds.
264. See, e.g., Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. L. Bucki & Son Lumber Co., 189 U.S. 135 (1903);
Wittich v. O'Neal, 22 Fla. 592, 599 (1886); Normal Babel Mortgage Co. v. Golden Heights
Land Co., 117 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 122 So. 2d 407 (Fla. 1960). In
Wittich, the Florida Supreme Court spoke eloquently of the equity of awarding attorney's fees
where the plaintiff has wrongfully seized the defendant's property pursuant to an extraordi-
nary remedy. Only the attorney's fees incurred to obtain the release of attached property are
recoverable, not those incurred to defend in the main action, even though a successful defense
will result in a return of the attached property. Consequently, it has been held that attorney's
fees may be awarded only when the plaintiff successfully moves to dissolve the attachment
in a separate proceeding. See, e.g., Bondy v. Royal Indem. Co., 184 So. 241 (Fla. 1938); Ritter
v. Miami Marine Agency, Inc., 133 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1961); Norman Babel
Mortgage Co. v. Golden Heights Land Co., 117 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 122 So. 2d 407 (Fla. 1960).
265. See Strickland v. Commerce Loan Co., 158 So. 2d 814 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1963)
(malicious garnishment of wages known to be exempt).
266. See Florida Transp. Co. v. Dixie Sightseeing Tours, Inc., 139 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1962).
267. See, e.g., Nash v. Walker, 78 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 1955) (improper garnishment); Cal-
cagni v. Mamber, 262 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1971); Martin v. Martin, 196 So. 2d
26 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 201 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 1967). But cf. Jones-Mahoney
Corp. v. C.A. Fielland, Inc., 114 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1959), in which the court
correctly observed that the Florida Supreme Court in Nash held merely that the trial of the
defendant's counterclaim for improper garnishment should be separated from the plaintiff's
action so as not to confuse the jury. This distinction has generally been overlooked by lower
Florida courts which consistently cite Nash as precluding counterclaims for improper attach-
ment or garnishment. See also Ritter v. Miami Marine Agency, Inc., 133 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (counterclaim in tort for wrongful garnishment properly raised but must
be separately tried).
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Thus, under the present Florida statute, the defendant will
usually (but not always) be able to recover any damages proxi-
mately caused by an erroneous attachment. These damages are lim-
ited to double the amount of the plaintiff's underlying claim,
2 6
8
which may not be enough to cover all consequential damages, and
the defendant must suffer the cost and delay incident to another
independent lawsuit to recover fully. 29 If the defendant believes the
plaintiff attached without probable cause or otherwise acted with
malice, he can sue on a tort theory to recover punitive damages in
addition to actual damages. However, the surety on the bond is not
liable for any recovery other than in a suit on the bond.
Chapter 76 should be amended to provide a cause of action for
wrongful attachment which does not require proof of any impro-
priety in seeking the improvident writ. Although it is probably not
compelled constitutionally, affording the defendant an absolute
right of redress for a wrongful attachment, no matter how well inten-
tioned that attachment may be, seems manifestly appropriate as a
matter of policy in striking a balance between the needs of creditors
and the rights of debtors. Rather than requiring a preseizure hear-
ing, the Mitchell rationale strives, first, to minimize the risk of ex
parte error and, where error occurs, to reduce its impact on the
debtor. Recognizing both that pre-judgment seizure is the exception
in our judicial system and that pre-hearing seizure is the exception
in our constitutional system, it does not seem unfair to impose the
cost of innocent error, as well as deliberate overreaching, on the
party who elects to exercise such an extraordinary remedy.
270
Further, the defendant should be entitled to compensatory dam-
ages on the successful prosecution of a motion to dissolve the writ
or by counterclaim incident to a successful defense on the merits of
the plaintiff's underlying action, rather than being forced to bring
a later action of his own. The statute should expressly authorize the
allowance as damages of a reasonable attorney's fee incurred in
recovering the property (but not in defense of the plaintiff's underly-
ing cause of action). This recommendation appears to be consistent
with present Florida policy as evidenced by the recent replevin
amendments. Section 78.20 was amended in 1976 to provide that
upon dissolution of a prejudgment writ of replevin, or upon final
judgment for the defendant on the merits, the defendant shall be
268. FLA. STAT. § 76.12 (1977) fixes the bond in this amount.
269. See Alexander, supra note 216, at 41-42.
270. In Steen v. Ross, Keen & Co., 22 Fla. 480, 485 (1886), the Florida Supreme Court
recognized the extraordinary nature of attachment and the legitimate need for appropriate
safeguards against the "improvident" issue of such writs.
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awarded any damages sustained and his attorney's fees and costs.2
The statute also provides expressly that this remedy does not
preclude any other legal remedies available to the defendant,272 pre-
sumably preserving the right to seek punitive damages in an action
for malicious prosecution or abuse of process. This is probably the
best resolution of the punitive damages issue, for proof of malice
requires additional evidence of an entirely different nature and is
uniquely appropriate for jury trial. It seems reasonable to provide a
speedy and sure (by reason of the plaintiff's bond) means of com-
pensating the defendant for his actual and consequential damages
but to relegate to another day his claim for punitive damages.
One other aspect of the bond provision should be mentioned. The
present statute fixes the amount of the plaintiff's bond at double the
amount of his claim against the defendant. This makes little sense.
The purpose of the bond is to indemnify the defendant for any injury
he may suffer as a result of improper attachment. This has no neces-
sary relation whatsoever to the amount of the plaintiff's claim,
which may greatly exceed the value of the property attached. Like-
wise, in the case of real property, the defendant does not actually
lose possession until after final judgment, so there is no danger that
the property will be destroyed in the meantime. Conversely, the
value of the property seized may not be adequate to safeguard the
defendant fully since consequential damages may greatly exceed the
value of the property attached. For example, attachment of a mer-
chant's inventory, even for a short period of time, may utterly de-
stroy his business, such as through the seizure of souvenir programs
and pennants just before the big game, where no market for the
goods will exist after their return.
2 73
A preferable method of determining the amount of the plaintiff's
bond would be to have the judge, in his discretion, fix the amount
at the time the plaintiff applies for the writ. The judge can weigh
variables such as the nature and value of the property and the
likelihood and magnitude of potential consequential damages. For
convenience, the statute might fix the amount at double the value
of the property to be attached unless the judge provides otherwise
by order.
271. Act of May 19, 1976, ch. 76-19, § 2, 1976 Fla. Laws 28 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 78.20
(1977)).
272. FLA. STAT. § 78.20 (1977).
273. In such a case, attachment will not benefit the plaintiff other than by putting pres-
sure on the defendant to settle quickly.
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d. Motion to Dissolve
The Florida Supreme Court said in Unique Caterers that the most
serious flaw in current chapter 76 is that it does not accord the
defendant a right to an "immediate" postseizure hearing. Instead,
it simply keeps the court open at any time to hear dissolution mo-
tions. 4
The United States Supreme Court has never established any fixed
time requirements for the postseizure hearing but has variously
characterized the requirement as the right to an "immediate," 7 '
"prompt, 2 6 or "early '277 hearing. The new replevin statute provides
that the court shall set down the motion to dissolve for "immediate"
hearing.2 8 This would seem to be sufficient.
The statute, though, should also make clear that the defendant
may file his motion to dissolve at any time.2 9 There is no rational
reason to require the defendant to act quickly in filing his motion.
The plaintiff suffers no prejudice from a delay, and the effect of a
short filing period, such as that found in the new Florida replevin
statute,10 is to put the defendant under some duress in trying to
arrange a hasty settlement.28 '
In order for the defendant to avail himself of his right to contest
the validity of the attachment, he must have timely notice of the
ex parte issuance of the writ and the levy on his property. At pres-
ent, chapter 76 does not require notice of the attachment to be
served on the defendant, although the Florida Rules of Civil Proce-
dure generally require service of all motions, orders, and other pa-
pers on every party to the action."2 The common law assumption
was that the sheriff's levy of the writ by seizing the property would
afford ample notice to the defendant. Although in many cases the
seizure may in fact afford actual notice of the attachment, this may
274. 338 So. 2d at 1071; see FLA. STAT. § 76.24(1) (1977).
275. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. at 610, 618.
276. Id. at 625 (Powell, J., concurring).
277. North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. at 607.
278. FLA. STAT. § 78.068(6) (1977).
279. This is consistent with present law. See J. Pollack & Co. v. George K. Murray & Co.,
20 So. 815, 818 (Fla. 1896).
280. See FLA. STAT. § 78.068(6) (1977) (10 days).
281. See note 213 and accompaying text supra.
282. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.080. Service is made by delivery or mail to the party himself, unless
represented in the action by an attorney. Id. at (b). All original papers must also be filed with
the court either before service or immediately thereafter. Id. at (d). Thus, the defendant
should be served with a copy of the motion for attachment, supporting affidavits, and bond,
as well as a copy of the writ itself. See 1 S. RAKSlN, supra note 31, at § 1.05A, at 37. When
suit is begun by attachment, the motion and writ may be served with the original process.
Id. See also H. TRAWICK, FLORIDA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 33-4, at 592 (1977 ed.).
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not always be so, especially in the case of a nonresident defendant,
one of the classic uses of attachment. Even in the case of a resident
defendant, seizure of isolated personal property may go unnoticed
for some time. In addition, in the case of real property, the filing of
a notice of attachment in the official records would seldom be timely
discovered.
Although Mitchell did not require specifically that formal notice
of the attachment be given to the defendant, the spirit of the deci-
sion strongly suggests it. The opinion did stress the defendant's
right to a prompt postseizure hearing. Obviously, this right is set at
naught if the defendant does not know of the attachment. More-
over, the interest of the plaintiff is in no way jeopardized by giving
the defendant notice after the levy. Therefore, the statute should
require expressly that notice of the attachment be served personally
on the defendant within three days of the levy unless otherwise
ordered by the judge due to unusual circumstances.28
In addition to bare notice, the defendant should also be informed
of the consequences of the attachment and of his legal right to
contest the attachment or regain possession of the property. Al-
though not constitutionally compelled, the legislature has often rec-
ognized the merits of such notice. For example, the new replevin
statute requires that the defendant be informed of his right to be
heard-personally or by attorney-at the show cause hearing and of
his right to regain possession of the property by posting a bond."4
Such notice is even more imperative where the seizure has already
taken place. Many defendants may erroneously believe that once
the property has been attached there is nothing they can do about
it. The notice should advise them of their right to file a motion to
dissolve the writ contesting either the grounds for the writ or the
merits of the plaintiff's underlying claim. Defendants should also be
informed of their right, alternatively, to repossess the property by
filing adequate security. Finally, they should be cautioned that they
are still entitled to their right to a full trial on the merits of the
plaintiffs claim and to the return of the property attached if they
are successful.
The statute should also state unequivocally that the burden of
proof is on the plaintiff to prove that he is entitled to the attach-
ment. 185 This means that he must prove by a preponderance of the
283. Cf. FLA. STAT. § 78.065(2)(b)-(c) (replevin).
284. Id. § 78.065(2)(e).
285. FA. STAT. § 76.24(2) (1977) provides only that "if the allegation in plaintiffs motion
which is denied is not proved to be true, the attachment shall be dissolved." This has been
construed, however, to put the burden on the plaintiff to prove the truth of the allegations.
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evidence the existence of the factual grounds upon which the writ
was issued26 as well as demonstrate the probable validity of his
underlying cause of action. 87 The first showing is conclusive since
the issue of the statutory grounds for attachment is immaterial to
the underlying claim. The second showing, on the other hand, is not
conclusive and must, of course, await full trial on the merits. In this
regard, the judge's determination at the hearing on the motion to
dissolve is somewhat analogous to the finding of likely outcome
generally associated with the issuance of a preliminary injunction.
2
11
The determination would require at least some credible evidence
in support of the facts necessary to establish a prima facie case for
the plaintiff, but it should also take into account any evidence of-
fered by the defendant by way of affirmative defense. The fact that
the plaintiff has posted security indemnifying the defendant in the
event of a final judgment for the defendant justifies continuing the
attachment on the basis of "probable" validity inasmuch as the
defendant does not need to post security to contest the attachment.
If the judge grants the motion to dissolve the writ, damages on the
bond for improper attachment should be awarded as a part of the
same proceeding, and the property should be returned forthwith to
the defendant.8 9
See, e.g., Southern Nat'l Bank v. Young, 142 So. 2d 788, 789 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1962);
Luciano v. Service Mach. Corp., 112 So. 2d 890, 892 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
286. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. at 618. Under the Florida attachment statute,
when the debt is due, the plaintiff must prove the amount of the debt and that it is actually
due but need only prove that he "has reason to believe in the existence of one or more of the
special grounds" for attachment. See FLA. STAT. § 76.09 (1977). This has been construed to
require the plaintiff to prove by admissible testimony actual facts which would induce a
prudent creditor justifiably to believe in the existence of the statutory grounds for attach-
ment, such as the defendant's fraudulent disposition of his property. See Reese v. Damato,
33 So. 459, 461 (Fla. 1902); Eckman v. Munnerlyn, 13 So. 922, 924 (Fla. 1893); Meinhard,
Bros. & Co. v. Lilienthal, 17 Fla. 501, 505-06 (1880). This does not require the plaintiff to
prove that the defendant in fact acted fraudulently, but it does require a factual basis for
the plaintiff's belief-that is, something more than being credibly informed as to the exist-
ence of the requisite facts. See Reese v. Damato, 33 So. at 461. When the debt is not actually
due at the time of the attachment, FLA. STAT. § 76.10 (1977) requires the plaintiff to allege
by affidavit other than his own and to prove the actual existence of the special statutory
grounds enumerated in § 76.05. See Caldwell v. Peoples Bank, 75 So. 848, 854 (Fla. 1917);
Lord v. F.M. Dowling Co., 42 So. 585, 589 (Fla. 1906); Tanner & Delaney Engine Co. v. Hall
& Mobley, 22 Fla. 391, 400 (1886).
287. North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. at 607; id. at 612 (Powell, J.,
concurring); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. at 609; cf. FLA. STAT. § 78.067(2) (1977)
(probable validity of underlying claim).
288. This requirement is variously articulated as a likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail
on the merits or as a probability of success at the trial on the merits. See, e.g., B.W. Photo
Util. v. Republic Molding Corp., 280 F.2d 806, 807 (9th Cir. 1960); W.A. Mack, Inc. v. General
Motors Corp., 260 F.2d 886, 890 (7th Cir. 1958); Flood v. Kuhn, 309 F. Supp. 793, 798
(S.D.N.Y. 1970). See generally J. DOBBYN, INJUNCTIONS IN A NUTSHELL 161 (1974).
289. Cf. FLA. STAT. § 78.20 (1977) (damages, including attorney's fees, awarded upon
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e. Rebond
As an alternative to seeking dissolution of the writ, the defendant
should have the right to" post adequate security and have the at-
tached property returned to him pending trial on the merits. The
current Florida statute so provides on the posting of a forthcoming
bond in double the value of the property attached or, if the value of
the property exceeds the plaintiff's claim, in double the amount of
the claim. 90 Although this provision was approved in Unique
Caterers, the amount should be reduced to the actual value of the
property attached unless the court orders otherwise. There does not
seem to be any reason to provide the plaintiff with security in an
amount greater than the value of the property attached since that
is the extent of his present security. The increased amount of the
bond is reflected in higher premiums for the defendant. The Florida
Legislature has already recognized the fairness of this approach in
the new replevin statute, which provides for bond in the value of the
property replevied. 211
f. Attachment of Necessities
One further problem must be considered. The Florida Constitu-
tion exempts from forced sale under judicial process the debtor's
homestead and one thousand dollars worth of personal property if
the debtor is the head of a family. 22 The 1978 Florida Constitution
Revision Commission proposed that the personal property exemp-
tion be increased to three thousand dollars and that it be extended
to every individual debtor, not just to heads of families.293
Section 76.08 now expressly provides that the plaintiffs motion
for attachment need not state that the debtor has no right to an
exemption."' Chapter 222, which implements the constitutional
dissolution of prejudgment writ of replevin). This would change existing Florida law, which
requires the defendant to bring a separate and independent action against the plaintiff for
improper attachment. See note 267 and accompanying text supra.
290. FLA. STAT. § 76.18 (1977).
291. Id. § 78.13; cf. id. § 78.068(4) (one and one-fourth times amount of plaintiffs claim).
Where the value of the property attached exceeds the value of the plaintiffs claim, the court,
in its discretion, can fix the bond in a lesser amount, although it may exceed the amount of
the claim to cover all allowable costs for which the defendant may be liable.
292. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a)(2), discussed in notes 371-77 infra.
293. See Fla. C.R.C., Rev. Fla. Const. art. X, § 4 (May 11, 1978). For a thorough discus-
sion of prior law and the commission's proposal, see Wall, Homestead and the Process of
History: The Proposed Changes in Article X, Section 4, 6 FLA. ST. U.L. Rav. 877 (1978).
294. Under the present exemption scheme, a creditor could attempt by affidavit to nega-
tive the debtor's homestead or personal property exemption by showing that the debtor is
not the head of a family or that the property is not a homestead. Under the proposed constitu-
tional revision, it would be impossible for a creditor to negative an individual debtor's per-
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exemptions, affords debtors the opportunity to declare their home-
stead exemption, either before or after levy,295 but does not afford
them the opportunity to claim their exempt personal property until
after levy."' Creditors are thus free to attach personal property
without regard to its exempt character, thereby depriving the debtor
of its use and possession, at least temporarily, until a claim of ex-
emption can be filed.297
This may result in severe hardship for the debtor and his family
if, for instance, such household necessities as a stove or a refrigerator
are attached.28 Although in such cases the plaintiff may be liable
on his bond for improper attachment,2 9 if the debtor later elects to
exempt the items attached, this remedy may be inadequate and in
any event will not alleviate the debtor's immediate needs. The at-
tachment of real property, on the other hand, does not pose any real
difficulty since the attachment merely constitutes a lien encumber-
ing the title.3 0 No court has ruled on the constitutional efficacy of
the present Florida exemption scheme in the context of prejudg-
ment attachment, although at least two Florida trial courts have
held the scheme invalid to the extent that it prevents judgment
debtors from claiming their exemptions before execution after final
judgment.
30'
sonal property exemption since all persons are entitled to the exemption, and, under FLA.
STAT. § 222.06 (1977), the debtor has the right to select the particular assets he wishes to
protect within the dollar-value limit. There is no way the creditor can foretell which assets
the debtor will select.
295. See id. §§ 227.01-.02.
296. See id. §§ 222.06-07.
297. Under id. § 222.06(2), the sheriff must within 24 hours serve the plaintiff with a copy
of the debtor's affidavit of exemption and thereafter return the property to the debtor unless,
within 24 hours of service, the plaintiff files a notice of contest. Id. § 222.06(3). Thus, the
debtor is generally deprived of exempt personal property for about 48 hours even if his claim
of exemption is uncontested.
298. In Randone v. Appellate Dep't, 488 P.2d 13 (Cal. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 924
(1972), the California Supreme Court held that any prejudgment seizure of the defendant's
"necessities of life," even after notice and a hearing, was a violation of the California Consti-
tution's due process clause. The court characterized "necessities" as those items the defen-
dant needs to live on, to work, to support his family, or to litigate the pending action. The
court mentioned such items as refrigerators, stoves, furniture, clothing, television sets, auto-
mobiles, sewing machines, and personal effects. 488 P.2d at 29-30.
The United States Supreme Court has again mentioned the notion of "necessities" in the
context of debtor-creditor relations. In Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 98 S. Ct.
1554, 1564 (1978), the Court held the utility's termination procedures unconstitutional for
failure to comply with due process.
299. See notes 254-69 and accompanying text supra.
300. See notes 229-34 and accompanying text supra.
301. See Gibson v. Atlantic Nat'l Bank, Civ. No. 74-7076 (Fla. 4th Cir. Ct. Mar. 5, 1975),
discussed in notes 393-96 infra; Mathis v. Purdy, 40 Fla. Supp. 17 (Fla 11th Cir. Ct. 1973);
cf. Betts v. Tom, 431 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Hawaii 1977) (due process requires judgment debtor
to negative exemptions before garnishing exempt funds). But cf. Brown v. Liberty Loan
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Whether or not it is compelled constitutionally, as a matter of
legislative choice chapter 76 should be amended to prohibit alto-
gether prejudgment attachment of personal property necessary for
the support of an individual defendant and his family. 302 Such a
limited prohibition would prevent the severe hardship visited upon
a debtor and his family by the deprivation, however temporary, of
the necessities of life until such time as the plaintiff has obtained a
final judgment and the defendant has had an opportunity to claim
his constitutional exemptions. It would not interfere in any way
with the attachment of a corporate defendant's assets, nor of a sole
proprietor's business assets, which is often of great concern to credi-
tors when the debtor's business begins to fail. This restriction would
also seem to have little application to the attachment of property
belonging to nonresident or absconding defendants since such prop-
erty could hardly be deemed "necessary" to their support. Thus,
amending the statute would not affect traditional means of invoking
quasi-in-rem jurisdiction.
Other methods of dealing with the problem are possible, but seem
either too broad or too burdensome. A system of prefiling personal
property exemption claims is possible. Such a system would, how-
ever, be administratively cumbersome and would require the debtor
to take the initiative in filing before any suit has been commenced.
Thereafter, periodic revisions would have to be made as the debtor's
assets changed. Requiring the plaintiff to negative the debtor's ex-
emptions might work tolerably well in identifying those who do not




but would be totally inadequate to deal with the proposed constitu-
tional changes extending the exemption to all persons and increas-
ing the exemption level to three thousand dollars. Completely bar-
ring all attachment of personal property belonging to an individual
Corp., 539 F.2d 1355 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 949 (1977) (judgment debtor not
entitled to further due process before postjudgment garnishment of exempt funds), discussed
in notes 397-413 infra.
302. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 487.020 (West Supp. 1978), the new California
attachment law, adopted effective January 1, 1977, culminating a five-year effort by the
California Law Revision Commission. See generally Note, California's New Attachment Law:
Problems in Interpretation, 23 U.C.L.A. L. Rzv. 792 (1976). Section 487.020 provides: "The
following property is exempt from attachment: . . . (b) Property which is necessary for the
support of an individual defendant or the defendant's family supported in whole or in part
by the defendant."
303. Cf. Noland Co. v. Linning, 132 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1961) (plaintiffs
motion for garnishment must allege wages not exempt). The Florida Legislature amended
FLA. STAT. § 77.03 to provide that the motion shall not negative the defendant's exemptions.
Act of June 27, 1967, ch. 67-254, § 27, 1967 Fla. Laws 560 (current version at FLA. STAT. §
77.03 (1977)).
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defendant seems overbroad, as does barring all attachment in aid
of the enforcement of a consumer debt.304
The only difficulty with the recommended proposal is the deter-
mination of what property is necessary for the debtor's support and,
thus, is not subject to seizure. It will be incumbent on the sheriff to
make this determination each time he undertakes to attach the
personal property of an individual defendant. Realistically, sheriffs
will often rely on the plaintiff's attorney, who customarily advises
what property is to be levied on. 30 Ultimately, of course, the courts
must decide what property constitutes the necessities of life. It
should not take long for the accumulated precedent to provide ade-
quate direction to the bar and the constabulary.
The statute itself might include an illustrative, but nonexclusive,
list of necessities such as the debtor's usual and ordinary household
furniture, clothing, appliances, and personal effects. Some items
obviously pose difficulty, such as television sets (which are not nec-
essary in the survival sense but might be deemed a minimal amen-
ity in contemporary American life) and automobiles (which provide
the transportation essential to modern urban life and work). 30 The
shifting nature of contemporary need is perhaps best left to evolu-
tionary development by the courts, subject to a statutory good faith
defense for sheriffs and creditors against claims of improper attach-
ment. 307 A similar statutory defense should be available to the sher-
iff who fails to attach property claimed by the creditor not to be
within the necessities-of-life exemption.
C. Garnishment (Chapter 77 of the Florida Statutes)
1. Constitutionality
In Ray Lein Construction, Inc. v. Wainwright, 30 in 1977, the Flor-
ida Supreme Court held the prejudgment garnishment provisions of
chapter 77 of the Florida Statutes unconstitutional as a violation of
due process. Specifically, the court found the statute constitution-
ally deficient under the Mitchell standards309 because it permitted
304. See CAL'. Civ. PROC. CODE § 483.010(c) (West Supp. 1978).
305. See 1 S. RAKUSIN, supra note 31, at § 5.05B(2), at 38a.
306. The California Supreme Court suggested in Randone v. Appellate Dep't that televi-
sion sets and automobiles were necessities of life. 488 P.2d 13, 29-30 (Cal. 1971), cert. denied,
407 U.S. 924 (1972).
307. Cf. FLA. STAT. § 77.06(3) (1977) (garnishee not liable to defendant if withholds pay-
ment in good faith).
308. 346 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 1977). See also Bunton v. First Nat'l Bank, 394 F. Supp. 793
(M.D. Fla. 1975).
309. 346 So. 2d at 1032.
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a writ to issue from the clerk without judicial supervision,3 ° the writ
could issue on an unsworn motion which need not allege any facts
showing that the plaintiff is entitled to garnishment, 3t and the stat-
ute did not require an immediate postseizure hearing, but merely
kept the court open at any time to hear dissolution motions. 12 The
court did not mention the requirement that the plaintiff post ade-
quate security to indemnify the defendant for any damages suffered
as a result of improper garnishment, so presumably this provision
of the present statute is adequate. 33 Likewise, the court did not
criticize the defendant's statutory right to secure release of the gar-
nishment by posting a payment bond in double the amount of the
plaintiff's claim or the amount garnished, whichever is less .1
2. Recommendation
a. Affidavit
The present statute provides that a writ of garnishment may be
issued before judgment upon an unverified motion if the plaintiff
states that the debt owed him by the defendant is "just, due and
unpaid," that the garnishment is not sought in order to injure either
the defendant or the garnishee, and that the plaintiff "does not
believe that defendant will have in his possession after execution is
issued, visible property in this state and in the county in which the
action is pending on which a levy can be made sufficient to satisfy
plaintiff's claim.' 3 5 This provision has been construed to create a
duty on behalf of the plaintiff to investigate the defendant's assets
and financial condition,3 16 and the plaintiff's belief has been deemed
justified where, for example, the defendant's balance sheet showed
it was insolvent.
317
In Ray Lein the court identified two respects in which the motion
310. FLA. STAT. § 77.031 (1977). FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.160 also provides that mesne process
may be issued by the clerk without praecipe.
311. FLA. STAT. § 77.031(1) (1977).
312. 346 So. 2d at 1032. The court subsequently overruled Ray Lein to the extent the
opinion intimated due process "requires" a postseizure hearing, declaring unequivocally that
due process merely requires an "opportunity" for a prompt postseizure hearing at the request
of the defendant. See Gazil, Inc. v. Gregor Food Serv., Inc., 356 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 1978),
discussed in notes 196-200 and accompanying text supra.
313. FLA. STAT. § 77.031(2) (1977) requires the plaintiff to post security in at least double
the amount of the debt demanded.
314. Id. § 77.24.
315. Id. § 77.031(1).
316. See Bertman v. Kurtell & Co., 205 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
317. See North Am. Tel. Corp. v. RDM Communication Serv., Inc., 535 F.2d 911 (5th Cir.
1976). The precise meaning of the word "visible," however, is obscure. Query whether it
means "known," "tangible," or "solvent"?
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called for by the present statute is deficient. First, it is unsworn, and
second, it does not require the plaintiff to allege specific facts in
support of his belief that the defendant's assets will be insufficient
to satisfy a judgment.
These defects should be cured by requiring the basis for plaintiff's
belief in the defendant's lack of visible property to appear clearly
from specific facts alleged in a verified motion or in a separate
affidavit in support of the motion. The language used in the garnish-
ment statute should track its counterpart provision in the attach-
ment statute as nearly as possible in order to promote better under-
standing and the development of a uniform, cohesive body of judi-
cial precedent construing both provisions.
b. Judicial Supervision
The court stated in Ray Lein that the writ must be issued by a
"judicial officer. ' ' 31 s The opinion went on, however, to reiterate an
earlier statement in Phillips v. Guin & Hunt, Inc.315 that the writ
might be issued by a clerk after making an "independent factual
determination" that the requirements of the statute were satisfied,
since clerks operate under the supervision of judges.32 Nevertheless,
for the same reasons mentioned in connection with attachment, the
statute should be amended to provide that a writ of prejudgment
garnishment may be issued by the clerk only on an order of a judge.
The court also emphasized in Ray Lein that it is constitutionally
imperative that a prejudgment writ of garnishment issue only after
an impartial factual determination is made concerning the exist-
ence of the elements essential for issuance of the writ. 32 1 This means
that the judge must determine the prima facie sufficiency of the
facts alleged by the plaintiff in support of his motion, not merely
their formal sufficiency. The judge must also make a preliminary
factual determination of the probable validity of the plaintiff's un-
derlying claim.322 The statute should express the requisite judicial
findings in language similar to that proposed for attachment.
c. Bond
For the same reasons discussed in connection with attachment,
the amount of the plaintiff's bond should be related to the likelihood
318. 346 So. 2d at 1032.
319. 344 So. 2d at 574.
320. Id. at n.7 (citing Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972)).
321. 346 So. 2d at 1032.
322. Cf. Phillips v. Guin & Hunt, Inc., 344 So. 2d 568, 574 (Fla. 1977) (court required "an
impartial factual determination" before issuance of writ under distress-for-rent procedures).
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and magnitude of harm which the defendant may suffer as a conse-
quence of a wrongful garnishment. It makes even less sense in the
garnishment of a debt due to the defendant than in the attachment
of his property to peg the amount of the bond to the amount of the
plaintiff's claim or the amount ultimately garnished (which usually
will not be known at the time the writ is issued), since the debt is
not paid to the plaintiff pending the outcome of the trial on the
merits but is retained by the garnishee
323 or paid into court.32 4
Any harm to the defendant flows from the loss of use of the funds
during the period of their impoundment. The wrongful garnishment
of a consumer debtor's bank account may, for instance, result in the
impairment of his credit rating because of his checks being dishon-
ored and, eventually, in the repossession of goods he has purchased
on credit if he is unable to pay his bills as they fall due. A commer-
cial debtor whose bank account has been garnished faces imminent
collapse if he cannot meet his payroll or pay his suppliers. Thus, in
the case of garnishment, the only rational basis on which to fix the
amount of the plaintiff's bond is to leave it to the discretion of the
judge, taking into account the nature and amount of the funds to
be garnished.
Chapter 77 should be amended along the lines suggested earlier
for chapter 76, to indemnify the defendant for all costs and damages
actually suffered as a result of a wrongful garnishment, including
the expense of dissolution proceedings, without regard to any impro-
priety or fault on the part of the plaintiff in obtaining the writ.
Although this would expand the plaintiff's exposure, and thus the
surety's under the bond-presently limited by the condition that
the garnishment be "improper"-it is more consistent with the
rationale of Mitchell requiring the state to minimize the impact of
erroneous seizures.
Lastly, chapter 77 should be amended expressly to authorize the
court to award damages to the defendant (including attorney's fees
incurred in obtaining dissolution of a wrongful garnishment) as a
part of the dissolution proceeding or by way of c6unterclaim when
the defendant prevails on the merits of the underlying action, with-
out the necessity of bringing a separate and independent lawsuit.
d. Motion to Dissolve
Presently, the defendant may, within twenty days of service of the
323. FLA. STAT. § 77.06 (1977). Section 77.19 authorizes the garnishee to withhold up to
twice the amount of the plaintiff's claim.
324. Id. § 77.082.
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writ, move to dissolve the garnishment.325 The court is always open
to hear such motions.2 6 In Ray Lein, the court held that this does
not satisfy the constitutional requirement for an immediate hear-
ing.32 The statute should be amended to require the court to set
down dissolution motions for an immediate hearing.3 Further, the
statute should place the burden clearly on the plaintiff329 to prove
the existence of the grounds upon which the writ was issued3 3 as
well as the probable validity of his underlying claim. 3'
Chapter 77 presents two other problems. First, it does not require
that the defendant be given timely notice of the garnishment, al-
though the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure require service of a copy
of the plaintiffs motion on the defendant.33 As in the case of attach-
ment, the spirit of Mitchell compels notifying the defendant of the
garnishment so that he may avail himself of his constitutional right
to have the garnishment reviewed judicially. The notice should also
include a brief summary of the defendant's legal right to contest the
garnishment.
33
Second, the present statute requires the defendant to file his mo-
325. Id. § 77.07(2). The statute does not specify service on whom, but there is no require-
ment that the writ of garnishment be served on the defendant, except as provided in §
77.06(2), regarding banks and other financial institutions. Although there is some common
law authority that the garnishee has a fiduciary duty to notify the defendant of the garnish-
ment, see, e.g., Agnew v. Cronin, 306 P.2d 527 (Cal. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1957), the defendant
may not actually learn of the garnishment until after the time to file for dissolution has
passed. See discussion of analogous problem regarding replevin at notes 211-20 and accompa-
nying text supra.
326. FLA. STAT. § 77.07(1) (1977).
327. 346 So. 2d at 1032.
328. See discussion regarding attachment at notes 282-83 and accompanying text supra.
329. FLA. STAT. § 77.07(2) (1977) is unclear but seems to put the burden of proof on the
plaintiff, as constitutionally required.
330. See Pleasant Valley Farms & Morey Condensery Co. v. Carl, 106 So. 427 (Fla. 1925),
in which the court examined the truthfulness of the plaintiff's allegations that the writ was
not sued out to injure the defendant and that the defendant did not have visible property
upon which execution could be levied after judgment.
331. FLA. STAT. § 77.031(1) (1977) requires the plaintiff to allege that the debt is "just,
due and unpaid." If denied by the defendant in his motion for dissolution, this puts in issue
the very matter raised by the plaintiff's underlying claim. Section 77.07(3)-(4) provides that
the judge may expedite the pleadings on this issue so that only one trial will be necessary.
See Luciano v. Service Mach. Corp., 112 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1959). See
generally 1 S. RAKUSIN, supra note 31, at § 2.09(D)(2), at 89.
332. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.080. In some jurisdictions there is a common law fiduciary duty
on the part of the garnishee to notify the debtor of the garnishment or otherwise protect his
interest in the funds, e.g., Agnew v. Cronin, 306 P.2d 527 (Cal. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1957), but
no authority has been found imposing such an obligation in Florida. Where a joint bank
account or other cotenancy deposit account is garnished, FLA. STAT. § 77.06(2) (1977) requires
that a copy of the garnishee's answer be served on the defendant.
333. See discussion regarding notice of attachment at notes 284-89 and accompanying text
supra.
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tion to dissolve within twenty days after service of the writ.34 Even
if the statute were amended to require service on the defendant,
there does not seem to be any reason to compel the defendant to
seek dissolution within any specified period of time. In fact, there
is even less reason than in the case of attachment 3 since the gar-
nished funds are not turned over to the plaintiff but are simply
retained by the garnishee pending final disposition of the underly-
ing action.36 The statute should be amended to permit the filing of
a motion to dissolve at any time before final judgment.
e. Rebond
The present statute always permits the defendant to secure the
release of garnished funds at any time by posting security in twice
the amount garnished or twice plaintiff's claim if less than the
amount garnished, conditioned to pay any final judgment rendered
in favor of the plaintiff.3 3 The amount of the bond required of the
defendant to secure the release of his funds should be reduced to the
lesser of the amount of the funds garnished or one and one-fourth
times the amount of the plaintiff's claim. This would compensate
the plaintiff fairly for the release of the garnished funds.
38
f Wage Garnishment
In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., the Supreme Court relied
heavily on the fact that wages are a special kind of property in
reaching the conclusion that due process required prior notice and
an opportunity to be heard before a defendant's wages could be
garnished.39 The expansion of this principle to cover all types of
property in Fuentes v. Shevin,310 followed by its subsequent qualifi-
cation to permit summary seizure under appropriate safeguards in
Mitchell v. WT. Grant Co.,34' left Sniadach's continued vitality
with respect to wages unclear. In North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v.
Di-Chem, Inc., Justice White, speaking for five members of the
Court, eschewed the idea of distinguishing among -different kinds of
property in rejecting the argument that due process did not apply
334. FLA. STAT. § 77.07(2) (1977).
335. See discussion at notes 282-83 and accompanying text supra.
336. FLA. STAT. §§ 77.06, .19 (1977).
337. Id. § 77.24.
338. See discussion regarding attachment at notes 290-91 and accompanying text supra.
339. 395 U.S. at 340.
340. 407 U.S. 95.
341. 416 U.S. 600.
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to garnishment of a corporate bank account.4 2 In a concurring opin-
ion, Justice Powell noted the ambiguity engendered by the majority
opinion and stated forthrightly his view that Sniadach remains an
exception to the general rule, requiring prior notice and a hearing
before the prejudgment garnishment of wages.'
The two statements are not necessarily irreconcilable. Due pro-
cess clearly applies to the taking of any type of property. However,
the nature of the property may be material in striking the proper
constitutional balance between the parties' competing interests.
The Court in Sniadach recognized the compelling interest of debtors
in protecting the cash flow generated by their wages against wrong-
ful interruption, even temporarily. In contrast, the need of creditors
for summary garnishment of wages is minimal since prior notice of
the creditor's efforts is unlikely to prejudice eventual collection.
The debtor could, of course, quit his job and seek employment
elsewhere, but this possibility is very remote, especially in these
times of chronic unemployment. Indeed, some courts have taken the
position that wages should never be garnished before final judg-
ment, even with prior notice and opportunity for hearing. There is
always the possibility the plaintiff will not prevail on the merits,
and the defendant may suffer irreparable injury for which money
damages for wrongful garnishment are inadequate3 41 The real rea-
son creditors seek to garnish wages before judgment, in the view of
many critics, is to gain leverage over the defendant to settle quickly
-regardless of the merits of the plaintiff's claim.34 The lower courts
have not agreed on whether wages may be summarily garnished
before judgment under a Mitchell-type statute or whether only a
statute requiring prior notice and a hearing will pass constitutional
muster.3
46
As a practical matter, the brutal impact of wage garnishment has
been reduced significantly by enactment of the Federal Consumer
Credit Protection Act of 1968, which exempts from garnishment,
before or after judgment, a minimum of seventy-five percent of all
debtors' wages.4 7 Florida law also exempts from garnishment all
342. 419 U.S. at 608.
343. Id. at 611 n.2.
344. See Randone v. Appellate Dep't, 488 P.2d 13 (Cal. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 924
(1972). Section 5.104 of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code also bars the use of prejudgment
wage garnishment.
345. See Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. at 341 & n.6 (citing Comment, Wage
Garnishment in Washington-An Empirical Study, 43 WASH. L. Rav. 743, 753 (1968);
Comment, Wage Garnishment as a Collection Device, 1967 Wis. L. Rav. 759).
346. See, e.g., Coltharp v. Cutler, 419 F. Supp. 924 (D. Utah 1976) (prejudgment wage
garnishment held valid); Williams v. Matovich, 560 P.2d 1338 (Mont. 1977) (invalid).
347. 15 U.S.C. § 1673 (1976). The statute also provides a "floor" exemption for all debtors
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wages due the resident head of a family.348 Thus, the only wages
presently exposed to lawful garnishment in Florida are twenty-five
percent of those due to persons who are not the head of a family.
The present state and federal exemptions of wages from garnish-
ment partially shield the debtors' personal earnings as a potential
source of recovery and thereby reducing the impact of a wrongful
seizure of wages. Even so, the Florida Statutes should be amended
ao prohibit the prejudgment garnishment of wages altogether. 4
This recommendation is consistent with the policy presently re-
flected in both the state and federal wage exemption statutes, even
though it is not constitutionally compelled. Wages would, of course,
remain subject to postjudgment garnishment to the extent they are
not otherwise exempt. As procedural safeguards to assure that
wages are not inadvertently garnished before judgment, the plain-
tiff's motion should include a statement that the debt sought to be
garnished is not due for the defendant's personal labor or services,
and all prejudgment writs should bear a conspicuous legend that
wages due the defendant are not subject to garnishment and are not
to be withheld under the writ.
3
M
If state policy is deemed to favor the retention of prejudgment
garnishment of nonexempt wages, due process requires that the
defendant be afforded prior notice and an opportunity to challenge
the legality of the proposed seizure. The statute should be amended
to provide for an order to show cause why the defendant's wages
should not be garnished. The procedure should be modeled after the
chapter 78 replevin procedure in which the judge fixes the time of
the hearing and the manner of service of the order on the defen-
dant.3 5' The order also should advise the defendant of his right to
assert any exemptions to the garnishment as well as to contest the
plaintiff's underlying claim. It should explain too the effect of a
failure to appear.32 If upon hearing the judge finds that the plaintiff
is entitled to the writ and that the defendant's wages are not ex-
equal to 30 times the federal minimum wage. Thus, the "floor" is presently $79.50 per week.
See note 384 and accompanying text infra.
348. FLA. STAT. § 222.11 (1977). This exemption is not preempted by the Consumer Credit
Protection Act, which permits more liberal state exemptions. 15 U.S.C. § 1610 (1976); see
Phillips v. General Fin. Corp., 297 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1974).
349. This suggestion is also advanced by the author of Note, Florida Wage Garnishment:
An Anachronistic Remedy, 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 681, 700 (1971).
350. Garnishment forms currently in use contain an explanation of the federal wage
exemption. The Florida Supreme Court could be invited to include an appropriate legend in
its approved garnishment form. See FLA. R. Civ. P. Form 1.907.
351. FLA. STAT. § 78.065(2) (1977).
352. Cf. id. § 78.065(2)(e)-(f) (order to show cause for writ of replevin).
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empt, the garnishment may issue. The usual bonding and rebonding
provisions would apply to the garnishment of wages.
V. THE POSTJUDGMENT PROCESS IN FLORIDA
A. The Nature of Postjudgment Process
1. Execution (Chapter 56 of the Florida Statutes)
The primary means of enforcing a money judgment is by writ of
execution. A writ of execution may be obtained from the clerk of the
court, without obtaining an order of a judge5 3 or posting bond, at
any time more than ten days after entry of the judgment in the
official records.3' The sheriff executes the writ by levying upon any
real or personal property belonging to the judgment debtor which
may be found within the jurisdiction. As with attachment, personal
property is usually levied on by actual seizure, while real property
is levied on constructively by recording a notice of levy in the official
records.
After levy, the property is sold by the sheriff at an execution
sale,355 and the proceeds are used to satisfy the judgment, any excess
being returned to the judgment debtor.3 15 The judgment debtor may
obtain a stay of any execution which is alleged to have been issued
illegally by filing an affidavit and posting an indemnity bond.s5 He
also has the right to obtain release of the property levied upon either
by substituting other property of equal value35 or by posting a forth-
coming bond in an amount equal to twice the value of the property
seized.35 9
2. Postjudgment Garnishment (Chapter 77 of the Florida
Statutes)
Garnishment can be used after final judgment to enable the judg-
ment creditor to reach debts due to the judgment debtor from third
parties as well as personal property belonging to the judgment
debtor which is in the possession of third parties.3" The motion to
353. FLA. R. Cw. P. 1.550.
354. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.550 provides that execution may issue at any time after the judg-
ment has been recorded and the time for serving a motion for a new trial or rehearing has
expired. Such motions must be served within 10 days after rendition of verdict in a jury action
or entry of judgment in a nonjury action. Id. at 1.530(b).
355. FLA. STAT. § 57.21 (1977).
356. Id. § 56.27.
357. Id. § 56.15.
358. Id. § 56.11.
359. Id. § 56.12.
360. Id. § 77.01.
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obtain a postjudgment writ of garnishment is similar to that for a
prejudgment writ.NI1 Garnishment may be sought either before or
after the return of an unsatisfied writ of execution.32  No bond is
required for the judgment creditor for postjudgment garnishment.
The judgment debtor may file a motion to dissolve a writ of garnish-
ment issued improperly or he may obtain release of the garnished
property by posting adequate security.' 36 The court is always open
to hear motions to dissolve a garnishment.3 '
3. Exempt Property
For the purpose of protecting the judgment debtor and the
debtor's family from destitution, Florida law exempts certain assets
from the reach of judgment creditors. The most significant of these
exemptions are the homestead, personal property, and wage exemp-
tions.
a. Homestead
Article X, section 4 of the Florida Constitution exempts from
forced sale under legal process the residence of a judgment debtor
who is the head of a family.365 The amount of property which may
be exempted as a homestead depends on whether it is urban or rural
property. 36 ' The Florida Statutes permit property owners to declare
361. Id. § 77.03.
362. Id.
363. Id. § 77.24.
364. Id. § 77.07(1).
365. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a)(1) provides:
(a) There shall be exempt from forced sale under process of any court, and no
judgment, decree or execution shall be a lien thereon, except for the payment of
taxes and assessments thereon, obligations contracted for the purchase, improve-
ment or repair thereof, or obligations contracted for house, field or other labor
performed on the realty, the following property owned by the head of a family:
(1) a homestead, if located outside a municipality, to the extent of one hundred
sixty acres of contiguous land and improvements thereon, which shall not be re-
duced without the owner's consent by reason of subsequent inclusion in a munici-
pality; or if located within a municipality, to the extent of one-half acre of contig-
uous land, upon which the exemption shall be limited to the residence of the owner
or his family . ..
The 1978 Constitution Revision Commission proposed making the exemption available to
all persons, not just heads of families. See Fla. C.R.C., Rev. Fla. Const. art. X, § 4(a) (May
11, 1978); Wall, supra note 293. This would have avoided the many thorny problems which
have long plagued Florida courts regarding who is the "head of a family." See generally
Crosby & Miller, Our Legal Chameleon, The Florida Homestead Exemption, 2 U. FLA. L.
REv. 12 (1949).
366. A rural homestead may include 160 contiguous acres and includes all improvements,
but an urban homestead is restricted to one-half acre and excludes all improvements except
the residence house. See note 365 supra.
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their property as homestead either before"' or after levy,3" but judg-
ment creditors can contest the owner's designation at any time. This
can be done either by requesting a survey to determine the accuracy
of the quantity of property claimed to be exempt' or by bringing a
creditor's bill to determine the legal validity of the claimed exemp-
tion." 0
b. Personal Property
The Florida Constitution also exempts from execution personal
property belonging to the head of a family up to an aggregate value
of $1,000. 37' The statutory procedure for claiming the personal prop-
erty exemption requires the judgment debtor, after levy, to make an
affidavit claiming the exemption and including an inventory of all
his personal property as well as the "true cash value" of each item.32
In an accompanying schedule the debtor may select the items he
wishes to designate as exempt, subject to the $1,000 limitation. s
Judgment creditors can contest the values claimed by the debtor
by filing a notice of contest with the sheriff within forty-eight hours
of the delivery of the debtor's affidavit. 37' The sheriff then appoints
a panel of three disinterested appraisers to value the defendant's
property. 75 If no notice of contest is timely filed, the sheriff must
The 1978 Constitution Revision Commission proposed that the urban homestead exemp-
tion be increased to one acre and that it include improvements in addition to the residence
itself. The commission proposed also that the distinction between rural and urban home-
steads be based on whether or not the property is used for agricultural purposes, rather than
whether it is located without or within the limits of a municipality. Mobile and modular
homes also would have been entitled to exemption under the commission's proposal. See Fla.
C.R.C., Rev. Fla. Const. art. X, § 4(a)(1) (May 11, 1978); Wall, supra note 293.
367. FA. STAT. § 222.01 (1977). The exemption is claimed by filing a statement in the
official records of the county in which the homestead is located.
368. Id. § 222.02. The exemption may be claimed even after sale. See Albritton v. Scott,
74 So. 975 (Fla. 1917); cf. Barclay v. Robertson, 65 So. 546 (Fla. 1914) (a year and a half after
sheriffs sale held to be unreasonable and claim of exemption denied).
369. FLA. STAT. § 222.03 (1977).
370. Id. § 222.10. A creditor's bill is an independent suit in equity seeking the court's
assistance in satisfying a judgment when there is no adequate remedy at law. A supplemen-
tary proceeding under § 56.29 serves much the same purpose. See generally Kline, Collection
Pursuant to Florida's Supplementary Proceedings in Aid of Execution, 25 U. M"An L. Rev.
596 (1971).
371. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a)(2). The 1978 Constitution Revision Commission recom-
mended increasing the exemption to $3,000 and extending it to all persons. See Fla. C.R.C.,
Rev. Fla. Const. art. X, § 4(a)(1) (May 11, 1978); Wall, supra note 293.
372. FLA. STAT. § 222.06 (1977). The statute does not permit the debtor to claim his
exemption before levy.
373. Id. § 222.07.
374. See id. § 222.06(2)-(3). Section 222.06(2) provides that the sheriff must serve the
creditor with a copy of the debtor's affidavit within 24 hours of receipt, and § 222.06(3) gives
the creditor 24 hours from receipt to file a notice of contest.
375. Id. § 222.06(4).
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immediately return the property claimed to be exempt to the
debtor.376 The judgment creditor may also challenge the validity of
the exemption by filing a creditor's bill.
3 7
c. Wages
Florida law exempts from garnishment or other process any debt
or other payment due to a resident head of a family for his personal
labor or services.3 78 The tracing of wages already paid to the debtor
and held in a bank account is not permitted under the Florida
exemption, and such funds are subject to garnishment. 371 The judg-
ment debtor claims his wage exemption after the garnishment by
filing an affidavit with the court issuing the writ. 380 Notice of the
affidavit is served on the judgment creditor, who has forty-eight
hours to contest the exemption, failing which the garnishment is
dissolved. The judgment creditor can also bring a creditor's bill in
equity to adjudicate the validity of the debtor's claimed exemp-
tion.3'
The Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act exempts from gar-
nishment seventy-five percent of the weekly earnings paid311 or pay-
able to any person as compensation for personal services, but in no
event does it exempt less than thirty times the current minimum
hourly wage. 3 This assures a minimum "floor" of funds for the
debtor's benefit which currently amounts to $79.50 per week.34 The
federal statute does not require that the debtor do anything to claim
the exemption, providing simply that no court shall make or enforce
376. Id. § 222.06(3). The remaining nonexempt property is subject to judicial sale, and
the proceeds are applied to satisfy the judgment.
377. Id. § 222.10. There is no time constraint for filing a creditor's bill. Thus, this proce-
dure may be used to challenge the debtor's exemption at any time.
378. Id. § 222.11. See generally Florida Wage Garnishment: An Anachronistic Remedy,
supra note 349.
379. See Hertz v. Fisher, 339 So. 2d 1148 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976). Contra, First
Prudential Bank v. Rolle, 45 Fla. Supp. 128 (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. 1976).
380. FLA. STAT. § 222.12 (1977).
381. Id. § 222.10.
382. 15 U.S.C. § 1673 (1976). The Federal Wage and Hour Administrator, who is charged
with the primary responsibility for enforcing the CCPA, id. § 1676, has ruled that wages
deposited in a bank account remain subject to the federal garnishment restriction. See Opin-
ions W.H. 171, 177, [1977] 6A LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 95:198r-s. At least one federal district
court has disagreed. See Dunlop v. First Nat'l Bank, 399 F. Supp. 855 (D. Ariz. 1975).
383. 15 U.S.C. § 163(a) (1976). Section 163(b) contains three exceptions, including the
collection of support payments and taxes.
384. The minimum hourly wage was raised to $2.65, effective January 1, 1978. See Fair
Labor Standards Amendment of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-151, § 2(a), 91 Stat. 1245 (to be codified
at 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1)).
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any order or process in violation of the debtor's right to the exemp-
tion.u
B. Constitutionality
In 1924, the Supreme Court held in Endicott Johnson Corp. v.
Encyclopdia Press, Inc. that due process does not require that a
judgment debtor be given notice and an opportunity for further
hearing before the issuance of a writ of execution.3 8 The rationale
of the decision was that the judgment debtor had had his day in
court, and the judgment rendered against him served as adequate
notice that execution would follow in due course. Endicott did not,
however, involve a claim of exemption by the judgment debtor.
Nevertheless, for more than fifty years the case has remained a
bulwark against the argument that a judgment debtor is entitled to
notice of execution or postjudgment garnishment so that he may
claim his exemptions before the property is taken from him.3 7
Even prior to Sniadach, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Hanner v. DeMarcus to reconsider the question of postjudgment
notice of execution," but it subsequently dismissed the writ as
improvidently granted."9 Four justices dissented to this dismissal in
an opinion written by Justice Douglas which suggested that Endi-
cott should be overruled. 30 Even if due process does not require
generally that notice of execution be given to the judgment debtor,
a strong argument can be made that under the Court's
"entitlement" theory of benefits conferred by statute, exempt prop-
erty cannot be seized without prior notice or at least a measure of
judicial supervision, as in Mitchell.39'
Several lower courts have considered the question since Sniadach.
385. 15 U.S.C. § 1673(c) (1976).
Courts are divided as to whether employees have an implied private cause of action to
enforce their rights under Title II of the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act, although
the cases have all dealt with discharge in violation of § 1674(a). Compare Stewart v. Trave-
lers Corp., 503 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1974) and Nunn v. City of Paducah, 367 F. Supp. 957 (W.D.
Ky. 1973), upholding a private right, with Western v. Hodgson, 359 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.W.
Va. 1973) and Simpson v. Sperry Rand Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1057 (W.D. La. 1972), vacated
on other grounds, 488 F.2d 450 (5th Cir. 1973), rejecting such a right. See generally Note,
The Implication of a Private Cause of Action Under Title III of the Consumer Credit Protec-
tion Act, 47 S. CAL. L. Rzv. 383 (1974).
386. 266 U.S. 285 (1924); see Alderman, Default Judgments and Postjudgment Remedies
Meet the Constitution: Effectuating Sniadach and Its Progeny, 65 Gzo. L.J. 1, 12 (1976).
387. See, e.g., South Fla Trust Co. v. Miami Coliseum Corp., 133 So. 334, 337 (Fla. 1931).
388. 389 U.S. 926 (1967).
389. 390 U.S. 736 (1968).
390. Id. at 740-42.
391. See Greenfield, A Constitutional Limitation on the Enforcement of Judgments-Due
Process and Exemptions, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 877, 898-906.
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A majority of the cases have clung to the Endicott rationale, al-
though several safeguards are necessary before exempt property
may be seized.
32
The issue has been raised twice in Florida. In Mathis v. Purdy,
in 1973, the judgment debtor attempted to file an affidavit designat-
ing the $1,000 worth of personal property he claimed was exempt
under the Florida Constitution.3 9 3 The sheriff refused to accept the
affidavit on the ground that the statute did not contemplate filing
of the affidavit until after the property had been levied on. The
Circuit Court for Dade County held that not permitting the exemp-
tion to be claimed before levy would violate due process. But the
court went on to construe the statute as permitting the affidavit to
be filed before levy, thereby avoiding the necessity of holding the
statute unconstitutional. The court also noted that this construction
was more consistent with the spirit of the Florida Constitution in
that it allowed the debtor the uninterrupted use and enjoyment of
the exempt property. The opinion did not go further and require
that notice be given to the judgment debtor.
In a similar class action brought on behalf of all judgment debtors
in Duval County, the circuit court followed Mathis and ordered the
sheriff to accept affidavits of exemption filed before levy by either
judgment debtors or defendants in pending litigation.3 19 The court's
order provided further that upon receipt of an affidavit before levy,
the sheriff shall deliver a copy to the judgment creditor or plaintiff,
who has twenty-four hours in which to file a notice of contest.315
Affidavits filed pursuant to the court's order are valid and must be
kept on file by the sheriff for two years, after which they can be
renewed by the judgment debtor.
3 9
Florida's postjudgment garnishment procedures have also been
attacked. In Brown v. Liberty Loan Corp., in 1974, judgment in the
amount of $646.03 was entered against Etta Jane Brown .3 Twelve
days later, without notice to Ms. Brown, the judgment creditor,
Liberty Loan Corporation of Duval, obtained a writ of execution
from the clerk of the county court. The writ was served on Ms.
Brown's employer, who answered the writ the same day, disclosing
392. See Betts v. Tom, 431 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Hawaii 1977) (AFDC funds); City Fin. Co.
v. Winston, 231 S.E.2d 45 (Ga. 1976) (garnishment); Coursin v. Harper, 225 S.E.2d 428 (Ga.
1976) (garnishment).
393. 40 Fla. Supp. 17 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. 1973).
394. Gibson v. Atlantic Nat'l Bank, Civ. No. 74-7076 (Fla. 4th Cir. Ct. Mar. 5, 1975).
395. Id., slip op. at 3.
396. Id. at 4.
397. 392 F. Supp. 1023 (M.D. Fla. 1974); see 3 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 626 (1975).
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its indebtedness to Ms. Brown in the sum of $7.50, which was there-
after duly withheld.
Upon learning of the garnishment the next day from her em-
ployer, Ms. Brown immediately filed an affidavit of exemption. Lib-
erty Loan filed a contradictory affidavit denying the exemption.
After a hearing, the court upheld Ms. Brown's exemption claim and
dissolved the writ. The day before the hearing, however, Ms. Brown
brought a class action in federal district court, alleging that the
Florida postjudgment garnishment procedures violated the due pro-
cess rights of all judgment debtors in Duval County. The district
court entered a judgment declaring the statutes unconstitutional
and awarding Ms. Brown money damages under United States Code
section 1983 for the denial of her civil rights.
3
1
In reaching its conclusion, the district court examined the govern-
mental and private interests involved. It noted that both state and
federal policies disfavor wage garnishment, as evidenced by the re-
spective exemption laws, and that the debtor's interest in prior
notice and an opportunity to be heard was very substantial because
of the hardship of even a temporary deprivation of wages. The court
also observed that many employers will discharge an employee
whose wages are garnished because of the burden and expense of
responding. 9
On appeal by the state, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
versed the district court decision and upheld the Florida postjudg-
ment garnishment statutes as satisfying due process.410 The Fifth
Circuit agreed that Endicott was no longer controlling and that a
balancing of interests was the proper constitutional analysis,40 ' but
concluded that the district court had struck an erroneous balance
because of a failure to weigh adequately certain interests of the state
and the creditor. 0 Both the state and the creditor have an interest
in the enforcement of judgments, the court reasoned, an interest
that is "patently weightier than a prejudgment creditor's interest in
freezing debtor assets to insure enforcement of a judgment" which
may never issue.40 3 This, the court felt, sharply distinguishes pre-
judgment from postjudgment garnishment cases.
398. 392 F. Supp. 1023.
399. Although 15 U.S.C. § 1674 (1976) prohibits discharge of an employee for the first
garnishment, an employee still may be discharged for a second garnishment. Id. § 1677(2).
400. Brown v. Liberty Loan Corp., 539 F.2d 1355 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
949 (1977).
401. 539 F.2d at 1365. A similar balancing analysis would be employed under the statutory
"entitlement" theory of exemptions. Id. at n.9.
402. Id. at 1363.
403. Id. at 1366.
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On the other hand, the court recognized that the debtor has a
substantial interest in preserving exempt assets from even a tempo-
rary deprivation. 04 The Florida postjudgment garnishment proce-
dures accommodate these competing interests adequately, the court
concluded. Although notice of garnishment is not served on the
judgment debtor, the court reasoned, both the judgment itself and
the garnishee's withholding of the debtor's wages give the debtor
effective notice of the garnishment as of the time of the actual
deprivation. Further, the fact of entry of judgment is the only essen-
tial requisite for the issuance of the writ and, although not reviewed
by a judge, is conclusively shown by documentary proof available
to the clerk.
The failure of the Florida Statutes to require the creditor to allege
specific facts showing that the debtor's wages are not exempt in-
creases the chance of a wrongful garnishment, as in Ms. Brown's
case, and is a "substantial defect,"' 0 5 the court declared. But it is
not fatal because the debtor has the unconditional right, without
bond, to a prompt judicial determination of his claim of exemption.
Although the statute does not expressly require an immediate hear-
ing, the exemption procedure appeared expeditious to the court and
was the "most significant factor" in its decision.' The court was
also mildly critical of the failure of the Florida law to protect the
debtor against wrongful garnishment except when the creditor has
maliciously sought to garnish wages known to be exempt.07
Ms. Brown argued strenuously that a more effective alternative
was available, at minimal risk and inconvenience to the creditor. 
0
She pointed to the action in Florida's Fourth Judicial Circuit. Fol-
lowing the district court's decision declaring the Florida Statutes
unconstitutional, the chief judge of the circuit, acting under his
administrative authority to secure the speedy and efficient adminis-
tration of the court's business, 09 had adopted an order prohibiting
clerks within the judicial circuit from issuing postjudgment writs of
garnishment unless (1) the creditor filed an affidavit attesting that
the debt sought to be recovered was not due to the judgment debtor
as wages, (2) the debtor was mailed notice of the motion for garnish-
ment and failed within ten days to file an affidavit of exemption,
404. Id. at 1363.
405. Id. at 1369.
406. Id. at 1368.
407. Id. at 1367-68; see Strickland v. Commerce Loan Co., 158 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1963).
408. 539 F.2d at 1366.
409. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.020.
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or (3) the clerk was ordered to issue the writ by a judge.4 '0 Although
the Fifth Circuit termed this argument "partially persuasive," it
refused to overturn the Florida statutory procedures."'
The federal district court for Hawaii recently declined to follow
Brown. In Betts v. Tom, in 1977, the court held that postjudgment
garnishment of a small bank account consisting entirely of AFDC
funds exempt under state law, without prior notice or affidavit of
nonexemption, was a violation of due process. ' The court found
that the statutory procedures, which were virtually identical to
those in Florida, exposed the debtor to a serious risk of at least
temporary deprivation of the exempt funds, thereby jeopardizing
the very survival of the debtor and her family. As alternatives, the
court suggested either that the debtor be given prior notice of the
garnishment and an opportunity to claim her exemptions or that the
court supervise the issuance of the writ through ex parte judicial
review of specific facts, shown by affidavit, negating the exempt
nature of the funds to be garnished, followed by notice of the gar-
nishment and the opportunity for a prompt postgarnishment hear-
ing on any exemptions claimed by the debtor.
1 3
C. Recommendation
Although the Florida postjudgment garnishment procedures were
finally upheld, the Fifth Circuit was somewhat critical of the lack
of debtor protection. The statutory means of asserting the constitu-
tional personal property exemption has been held wanting by at
least two state trial courts. It may be possible to devise a system
which would provide judgment debtors with significantly greater
protection against even temporary deprivation of exempt assets at
virtually no additional cost or risk to creditors. The Florida Statutes
should be amended to provide for: (1) a means of permitting judg-
ment debtors to claim all their exemptions at any time after the
entry of judgment, (2) meaningful notice to all judgment debtors of
410. See In re Procedure for the Issuance of Writs of Garnishment After Judgment (un-
numbered) (Fla. 4th Cir. Ct. Jan. 10, 1975).
411. 539 F.2d at 1366. The Fifth Circuit said that the Florida procedures significantly
advanced the creditor's interest by impounding the debtor's wages pending resolution of the
exemption issue, thereby securing the creditor against dispersal of the funds. Id. at 1367. As
a matter of policy, however, the debtor's interest in the uninterrupted use of his accrued
wages, which may be vital to the welfare of the debtor and his family, must be weighed
against the creditor's added security.
412. 431 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Hawaii 1977).
413. Id. at 1377-78. The court restricted its decision to the garnishment of exempt AFDC
funds. The decision did not apply to all postjudgment garnishment. Id. at 1379. The court
construed "prompt" to mean within two working days. Id. at 1378.
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their right to claim exemptions, and (3) a prohibition against the
seizure of assets claimed to be exempt by filing until after judicial
determination of the exemption issue.
1. Right to Prefile Exemptions
Chapter 222 of the Florida Statutes should be amended to allow
a judgment debtor to file an affidavit with the clerk of the court
claiming his exemptions from final process at any time after the
entry of the judgment. Section 222.01 already permits debtors to
declare their homestead before levy, and the court order issued by
the Circuit Court for Duval County"' established a prefiling system
for claiming exempt personal property.
Other means of preventing the initial seizure of exempt property
have been suggested. One alternative is to require judgment credi-
tors to negate the debtor's exemptions. Allowing judgment debtors
to claim their own exemptions is the better alternative, however,
since debtors are in a better position to know the facts upon which
the exemptions are based than are their creditors. Moreover, put-
ting the burden on the judgment debtor to take the initiative in
claiming his exemptions is consistent with the present evidentiary
burden the debtor carries in claiming exemptions.415 It is also less
expensive for the creditor. No investigation of the debtor's circum-
stances is necessary, and the lawyer is not required to have the
application for process reviewed by a judge. Moreover, it saves
judicial time.
The claim of exemption would be made by the debtor's affidavit
alleging the requisite facts supporting the claim. For simplicity, the
supreme court could be invited to promulgate forms for the use of
debtors, and court clerks might be encouraged to assist judgment
debtors without counsel.
The homestead and wage exemptions should cause little problem.
Both require the debtor to be the head of a family, a status usually
apparent, although some nice questions can arise. A description of
the premises or the name of the employer, as the case may be,
complete the information needed and pose little difficulty.", Prefil-
ing the debtor's claim of exempt personal property is more difficult.
414. Gibson v. Atlantic Nat'l Bank, Civ. No. 74-7076 (Fla. 4th Cir. Ct. Mar. 5, 1975).
415. Although this procedure would permit judgment debtors to claim their exemptions
before levy, there undoubtedly would be some debtors who failed to do so. The failure to
prefile for exemptions should not be deemed a waiver, and the debtor would continue to have
a right to claim his exemptions after levy as presently provided.
416. Some problems may be encountered regarding the legal description of the premises
and the acreage limitations.
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The debtor is allowed to select the items of personal property he
wishes to protect, subject to the $1,000 valuation limit. A person's
personal assets are constantly shifting. Their value is ever-changing
as they depreciate or are consumed. Section 222.06 avoids these
problems by valuing the property and giving the debtor his choice
at the time of each levy.
Any system of prefiling must provide for periodic revision. Change
of circumstances affecting exemptions is not, of course, limited to
personal property, although the impact of change is much greater.
Thus, debtors should be under an obligation to amend their affida-
vits as material changes in circumstances occur or, in the case of
personal property, if they merely wish to change their selection. It
is not necessary to perpetuate the present practice which requires
the debtor to inventory and value his entire personal estate in order
to claim his $1,000 personal property exemption. This serves no
useful purpose, except to provide the creditor with some free discov-
ery of the debtor's other leviable assets. It is sufficient for the debtor
merely to schedule and value those assets he wishes to exempt.
To ensure that exemption claims do not become stale due to the
passage of time and neglect, the effectiveness Of a prefiled claim
should be limited to twelve months, with an unlimited right of
renewal. This would augment the debtor's duty to amend his claim
when changes occur and would remind the debtor that the judgment
remains unsatisfied.
The prefiling of exemptions necessitates some modification in the
procedures by which exemption disputes are heard and resolved.
The present exemption statutes (except homestead) require the
creditor to deny exemptions claimed by the debtor within forty-
eight hours. The property has been seized already and it is necessary
to resolve disputes quickly so the property can be returned to the
debtor if it is found to be exempt. Where the debtor claims his
exemptions before levy, there is no need for exemption disputes to
be resolved so hastily. Therefore, the creditor should be allowed to
contest an exemption at any time. This is permitted now by credi-
tor's bill under section 222.10, but this procedure is cumbersome,
amounting in effect to an independent suit in equity requiring serv-
ice of process and proper jurisdiction and venue.
A much simpler method of resolving exemption disputes, using
present procedures, would be to have the creditor bring his chal-
lenge in the form of a supplementary proceeding under section
56.29. A supplementary proceeding is ancillary to the underlying
suit in which the judgment was rendered. The proceeding is initi-
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ated by a motion which must be served on the judgment debtor,"7
but no independent jurisdictional grounds are necessary.
Although the scope of supplementary proceedings under the pres-
ent statute is probably broad enough to encompass exemption dis-
putes, section 56.29 should be amended to make specific reference
to exemption disputes to alleviate any uncertainty by the bench or
bar. The statute also should empower the court to award attorney's
fees to the debtor if the creditor is not acting in good faith in contest-
ing the debtor's claim of exemption and, conversely, to award attor-
ney's fees to the creditor if the debtor's claim of exemption is frivo-
lous or in bad faith.
4 18
2. Notice to Judgment Debtor
A system of prefiling exemption claims will not serve its purpose
of preventing the temporary loss of exempt assets unless judgment
debtors are given timely and meaningful notice of their right to
prefile. Chapter 222 should be amended to require the mailing of
written notice to all judgment debtors by the clerk of court at the
time the judgment is recorded in the official records. This notice
should advise the debtor that a judgment has been entered against
him and that the judgment creditor is entitled to an execution on
the judgment after ten days without further court action.'19 The
notice also should advise the judgment debtor that some or all of
his property might qualify for exemption from execution and that
he has a right to claim his exemptions by filing an affidavit with the
clerk of the court. The exact form of this notice should be prescribed
by rule by the supreme court.
3. Application for Process
The judgment creditor's application for a writ of execution should
include an affidavit attesting to the entry of judgment, want of
satisfaction, and the judgment debtor's failure to file an affidavit of
exemption or the court's decree that the property is not exempt.
Chapter 77 also should be amended to require a similar affidavit in
support of the creditor's motion for postjudgment writ of garnish-
ment. Furthermore, since the affidavit need attest only to facts of a
conclusory nature, based largely on the court records, there is no
reason to have it reviewed by a judge. Thus, the writ may be granted
by the clerk upon a pro forma review of the creditor's affidavit, as
417. FLA. STAT. § 56.29(3) (1977).
418. Cf. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.380(c) (expenses on failure to make discovery).
419. Id. at 1.550; see discussion at note 354 supra.
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under the present practice. 20
In Brown, the Fifth Circuit mentioned as a weakness of the pres-
ent Florida procedure the lack of a requirement that the judgment
creditor show by affidavit facts demonstrating the nonexempt na-
ture of the assets to be seized.'' To be meaningful, a factual affida-
vit of this kind would have to be reviewed by a judge exercising
discretion in passing on the sufficiency of the creditor's allegations.
Although such a requirement would, perhaps, provide an additional
safeguard against seizure of exempt assets when the judgment
debtor failed to prefile his exemption claim, it would also add sub-
stantially to the cost of execution, both for the creditor and the
court. On balance, this added burden is not justified when the
debtor is allowed to prefile his exemptions. If the debtor fails to
protect his exempt property by prefiling, the judgment creditor
should be allowed levy on the property in reliance on the record,
without further investigation, subject to the debtor's right to re-
claim the property after levy upon a showing of exemption.
The court in Brown also noted critically the absence of a meaning-
ful remedy for wrongful postjudgment execution.422 Under present
Florida law, wrongful seizure of exempt property after judgment is
actionable only if the creditor knows the property is exempt and
thus is acting maliciously. Judgment debtors should be given a
statutory cause of action against judgment creditors for wrongful
execution when exempt property is seized after the debtor has filed
an affidavit of exemption. A similar action should be created for
wrongful postjudgment garnishment.
These new remedies may pose a timing problem when the debtor
files his affidavit after the creditor has already obtained the writ and
delivered it to the sheriff for levy or service. Since the debtor has
ten days to prefile his exemption claim before the creditor can ob-
tain a writ of execution, the debtor is in a better position to avoid
the problem through a timely filing. Therefore, the creditor should
be held liable for wrongful execution or garnishment only when the
debtor's affidavit of exemption was on file at the time the judgment
creditor filed his application for process.
As for the measure of damages under the new remedies, the stat-
utes should provide for all consequential damages resulting from
wrongful seizure, including reasonable attorney's fees in obtaining
release of the exempt property. The judgment creditor should not,
420. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.160.
421. 539 F.2d at 1367.
422. Id. at 1367-68.
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however, be required to post a bond for these damages as a condition
of obtaining a writ of execution or postjudgment garnishment. The
risk of a wrongful taking seems minimal, and the judgment debtor
can offset his damages against the creditor's judgment, which pro-
vides security for the debtor.
The statute should preserve expressly the debtor's present com-
mon law remedies of malicious prosecution and abuse of process.
Although requiring proof of malice, these remedies would remain
effective in preventing a knowing postjudgment seizure of exempt
assets when the debtor has failed to prefile his exemptions. In this
regard, it is necessary to emphasize the procedural purpose of the
prefiling provisions, which merely entitle the judgment creditor to
a writ of execution or garnishment for the initial seizure of the
property, subject to the debtor's subsequent claim of exemption.
The debtor's failure to prefile his exemptions is not a waiver justify-
ing the judgment creditor's seizing property known to be exempt in
an effort to take unfair advantage of the debtor's inaction.
Of course, in an action for abuse of process, the debtor carries the
burden of proving that the creditor knew or should have known the
property was exempt. This may, however, offer the debtor a means
of persuading a judgment creditor who obtained a writ of execution
before the debtor filed his exemption, but whose writ has not yet
been levied, not to carry out the levy after being notified of the
debtor's claimed exemption. A debtor then, should always check
with the clerk at the time he files his affidavit of exemption, at least
if he does not file within ten days of entry of judgment, to see if a
writ of execution or garnishment has already been issued to the
judgment creditor. If so, prompt notice to the creditor of the claimed
exemption may successfully prevent actual seizure of the exempt
property.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the past two years the Florida Supreme Court has found serious
constitutional defects in the state's present provisional remedy stat-
utes. The United State Supreme Court has concluded that due pro-
cess in debtor-creditor relations does not always require prior notice
and an opportunity to be heard before prejudgment taking of a
debtor's property, provided the seizure is subject to close judicial
supervision to minimize the risk and reduce the impact of error on
the debtor. Due process requires only a proper balancing of the
competing interests involved.
The proposals recommended in this article attempt to strike a
proper balance between the interest of the state in providing credi-
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tors with effective remedies for the prompt and efficient collection
of just debts and the interest of debtors in preventing any wrongful
interference in the use and enjoyment of their property. These pro-
posals afford debtors significantly greater procedural safeguards
with little sacrifice in the effectiveness or cost of collection for credi-
tors. It is hoped that they will both satisfy contemporary constitu-
tional scrutiny and foster continued availability of credit at reason-
able cost.

